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Drug Truce 
ALEX KREIT* 
After enjoying nearly universal support from elected officials for 
decades, the war on drugs is under attack. Prominent politicians from 
across the ideological spectrum have started to call for an “end to the 
war on drugs.” New Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie 
pledged to “end the failed war on drugs” in his second inaugural 
address. President Barack Obama’s first drug czar went so far as to 
claim that the administration had already “certainly ended the drug 
war.” But what does an “end to the war on drugs” really mean? 
Although some people might equate it with legalization, both Christie 
and Obama oppose legalizing even marijuana.  
 
Scholars have critiqued specific components of the drug war since it 
began. There is also a rich literature debating the relative merits of 
legalization and prohibition. But the question of what separates the 
drug war from non-war prohibition has been almost completely 
overlooked. This Article aims to help fill this gap by plotting out a 
drug war exit strategy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The war on drugs is over, at least according to President Barack Obama’s 
first “Drug Czar,”1 Gil Kerlikowske. In his first interview after taking office in 
2009, Kerlikowske said he thought it was time to retire the drug war concept 
in favor of a public health approach.2 In 2011, Kerlikowske described his 
outlook in even bolder terms, telling a reporter, “We certainly ended the drug 
war now almost two years ago.”3 Kerlikowske’s successor, Michael Botticelli, 
has taken a similar tack, saying in late 2015 that the drug war “has been all 
wrong” and expressing his aversion to being referred to as drug czar 
“[b]ecause I think it connotes this old ‘war on drugs’ focus to the work that we 
do.”4 
Despite Kerlikowske’s declaration that we have achieved peace already, 
the federal drug laws and policies in place today are not all that much different 
than they were twenty or thirty years ago.5 President Obama’s National Drug 
Control Budgets have largely mirrored those of his predecessors, at least in 
terms of the overall spending allocations. President George W. Bush’s first 
drug control budget in 2002 put 45.6% toward treatment and prevention 
programs with 54.4% going to supply reduction measures like domestic law 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Although the official title is Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
the position is more commonly referred to as “Drug Czar.” DAVID F. MUSTO, THE 
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 280 (3d ed. 1999).  
 2 Gary Fields, White House Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs,’ WALL STREET J. (May 
14, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124225891527617397 [https://perma.cc/Q27F-
DJ69]. 
 3 Jacob Sullum, End ‘War on Drugs’ by Legalizing Drugs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 15, 
2011, at C32 (quoting Gil Kerlikowske). 
 4 Scott Pelley, A New Direction on Drugs, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-a-new-direction-on-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/36 
FT-JU28]. 
 5 Peter Reuter, Why Has US Drug Policy Changed So Little over 30 Years?, in 42 
CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975–2025, at 75, 76 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) 
(“[T]here has been scarcely any serious policy change beyond a very recent increase in 
[drug] treatment funding . . . .”). 
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enforcement and interdiction.6 The Obama administration’s 2015 budget 
allocated 43.9% of federal drug control dollars to demand reduction and 
56.1% to supply reduction.7 Meanwhile, federal criminal drug statutes are 
more or less exactly as they were on the day President Obama took office, 
with one notable exception—a reduction in the disparity between crack and 
powder cocaine sentences from 100-1 to 18-to-1 in the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010.8  
With drug laws and budgets largely unchanged under Obama, 
Kerlikowske’s claim to have “certainly ended the drug war” in 20099 evokes 
of the story of Hiroo Onoda, the Japanese solder from World War II who spent 
nearly thirty years in the Philippine jungles after 1945 convinced that the war 
was still being waged.10 Only in this case, the drug war marches on while its 
ostensible commanders labor alone in the belief that hostilities have come to 
an end. 
But while the drug war is not yet over, there is a rapidly growing political 
consensus that the war on drugs should end. In his second inaugural address, 
in 2014, New Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie declared: “We will 
end the failed war on drugs that believes that incarceration is the cure of every 
                                                                                                                     
 6 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2009 BUDGET 
SUMMARY 13 (Feb. 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-
and-research/fy09budget_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTE4-LNTU]. 
 7 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FY 2016 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY: 
COMPANION TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 21 (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/fy_2016_budget 
_summary.pdf#page=22 [https://perma.cc/362M-WK45]. These numbers may actually 
overstate the amount of money Obama’s budget puts toward demand reduction relative to 
Bush’s. This is because the federal drug control “[b]udget experienced a significant 
restructuring in FY2012” in which the Office of National Drug Control Policy “reviewed 
all federal programs with a ‘drug control nexus’” and added nineteen programs or agencies 
to the federal drug budget. LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41535, REAUTHORIZING THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ISSUES FOR 
CONSIDERATION 5 (2014). Under the restructuring, the demand reduction budget line nearly 
doubled, with a more modest increase to the supply reduction line. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FY 2012 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY: COMPANION TO THE 
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 7 (Apr. 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defa 
ult/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/FY2012-Budget-and-Performance-Summary-April-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PS9P-AJXZ]. As a result, while the previous budget structure would have 
had 36.7% of the drug control budget going to demand reduction, id., the revised budget 
structure had demand reduction accounting for 40.7% of the budget, id. at 19. This 
difference was not due to changes in federal spending but to changes in which programs 
are counted when calculating the drug control budget. See id. at 5–7. 
 8 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).  
 9 Sullum, supra note 3, at C32 (quoting Gil Kerlikowske). 
 10 HIROO ONODA, NO SURRENDER: MY THIRTY-YEAR WAR 11–14 (Charles S. Terry 
trans., 1st ed. 1974). 
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ill caused by drug abuse.”11 A few months later, Republican Kentucky Senator 
Rand Paul said he will “do everything to end the war on drugs.”12 On the left, 
New Jersey Senator Cory Booker has called the war on drugs a “tremendous 
failure.”13 And California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom’s campaign 
website features an issues page that begins: “The war on drugs has failed.”14 
With so many elected officials loudly abandoning the drug war, it is hard to 
believe that as recently as 2008, former Virginia Senator Jim Webb was 
lamenting the fact that “to be viewed as ‘soft on crime’ is one of the surest 
career-killers in American politics.”15  
While interest in “ending the drug war” is undeniable, it is less clear what, 
exactly, that means or how the goal can be achieved. 
Does an end to the drug war mean the legalization of some or even all 
drugs? Or, is it possible to end the war against drugs while retaining drug 
prohibition? Certainly, Chris Christie, Gil Kerlikowske, and Michael Botticelli 
have to believe that it is, since all three remain firmly opposed to legalizing 
marijuana, let alone other drugs.16 Indeed, during his 2016 presidential 
campaign, Christie said that if he were elected President he would try and 
shutdown state marijuana legalization laws.17 But if “ending the drug war” 
does not mean “legalization,” how should we define it? What legal and policy 
changes would need to occur for us to say that the drug war has truly come to 
an end?  
Thinking about these questions, it does not take long to realize that there is 
no bright line dividing drug war from drug truce. If you were to ask ten drug 
war opponents to describe what the drug war is, you would probably get ten 
different answers. Unlike, say, social security or the Affordable Care Act, the 
drug war is more a philosophy than it is a readily identifiable set of laws. The 
drug war manifests itself in the form of high arrest rates, mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws, the militarization of the police, disproportionate impacts on 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Radley Balko, Christie: ‘We Will End the Failed War on Drugs,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 
21, 2014) (quoting Chris Christie), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/20 
14/01/21/christie-we-will-end-the-failed-war-on-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/D3FD-ZYQL]. 
 12 Jacob Sullum, Rand Paul Last Week: ‘I Want to End the War on Drugs,’ REASON: 
HIT & RUN BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting Rand Paul), http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/18/ 
rand-paul-last-week-i-want-to-end-the-wa [https://perma.cc/4M6Y-FAFP]. 
 13 Mollie Reilly, Cory Booker Condemns Drug War as ‘Tremendous Failure,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2013) (quoting Cory Booker), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/08/18/cory-booker-drug-war_n_3777132.html [https://perma.cc/WJ9C-WEZ8]. 
 14 Rethinking Our Drug Policy, GAVIN NEWSOM FOR GOVERNOR 2018, 
http://www.gavinnewsom.com/issues/drugpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/ST7T-FAXT]. 
 15 JIM WEBB, A TIME TO FIGHT: RECLAIMING A FAIR AND JUST AMERICA 216 (2008). 
 16 Eliza Collins, Chris Christie Doubles Down on Marijuana Comments, POLITICO 
(July 29, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/chris-christie-enforce-marijuana-
illegal-2016-120769 [https://perma.cc/2RVR-LLZ5]; Fields, supra note 2; Pelley, supra 
note 4. 
 17 Collins, supra note 16. 
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people of color, and so on. But of course, any system of prohibition is going to 
include at least some arrests and incarcerations.  
Complicating matters further, even if we had a clear vision of what it 
means to “end the drug war,” it would take a lot more than an act of Congress 
to make it so. Domestic drug law enforcement is highly decentralized. The 
vast majority of drug enforcement decisions take place at the local level under 
state law.18 As a result, the federal government’s influence over drug policy is 
surprisingly limited, as evidenced by the failure of its decade-plus effort to 
block the implementation of state-level medical marijuana legalization.19 On 
the one hand, this dynamic has done as much as anything to help to fuel 
reform, with states leading the way on legalizing marijuana, repealing 
mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws, and increasing the use of deferred-
prosecution in drug cases.20 On the other hand, it makes it that much harder to 
replace the drug war with a new national policy. Consider this: If federal drug 
officials were to set a goal like cutting drug arrests in half nationwide, they 
would be almost entirely dependent on local officials to achieve it.  
This Article examines how to begin defining a drug truce and what sorts of 
changes in law and policy might be required to move toward it. In contrast to 
the well-worn debate about legalization versus prohibition or focused inquiries 
into specific drug war-era policies like mandatory minimum sentencing laws, 
relatively little attention has been paid to these broad questions. My goal here 
is not to advocate for a specific set of policy proposals or address every aspect 
of the drug war. Instead, I focus on identifying the qualities that differentiate 
the modern domestic drug war21 from standard drug prohibition. I proceed 
from the premise that, with the exception of marijuana where legalization 
looks increasingly inevitable, a postwar drug policy will retain drug 
prohibition. The challenge for the next decade of drug policy will be to more 
clearly identify the line that separates the drug war and non-war prohibition 
and to figure out how to get to the other side. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a brief chronological 
history of the war on drugs. As the discussion will show, the drug war cannot 
be traced to a single policy development or moment in time. Instead, it 
                                                                                                                     
 18 E.g., Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for 
Compromise?, 91 OR. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 (2013). 
 19 See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or 
Abandon) Marijuana Bans, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Dec. 12, 2012, at 19–21. 
 20 See generally RAM SUBRAMANIAN & REBECKA MORENO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
DRUG WAR DÉTENTE? A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL DRUG LAW REFORM, 2009–2013 (Apr. 
2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/state-drug-law-reform-
review-2009-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/U96M-JG72] (providing an overview of state-level 
drug policy reforms since 2009). 
 21 This Article does not address international drug control. For a recent treatment of 
the global war on drugs, see, for example, LSE EXPERT GRP. ON THE ECON. OF DRUG 
POLICY, ENDING THE DRUG WARS (May 2014), http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/r 
eports/pdf/LSE-IDEAS-DRUGS-REPORT-FINAL-WEB01.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AW9-
5CKN].  
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matured over three decades, turning from a rallying cry in the 1970s to an 
organizing principle for nearly every drug law and enforcement policy in the 
1980s and 1990s. Part II builds on this history toward a definition of the war 
on drugs. At first glance, disentangling the drug war from drug prohibition can 
seem hopeless. Though I acknowledge the line between the drug war and non-
war prohibition is incapable of precise demarcation, I highlight four 
characteristics that separate the two: ideology, arrest rates, incarceration rates, 
and racial disparity. Part III, the core of the Article, looks at what sorts of 
changes to ideology, law, and policy will be needed to move toward an end to 
the war on drugs. Because drug enforcement is incredibly decentralized, with 
state and local actors responsible for the bulk of drug enforcement, ending the 
drug war is much easier said than done. With this in mind, I examine the 
possibilities and challenges for achieving a drug truce when it comes to 
arrests, incarceration, and racial disparity. I also propose three principles to 
guide drug policy in the postwar era. Finally, Part IV concludes.  
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DRUG WAR 
The war on drugs is one of the most familiar public policy ideas of the past 
four decades22 but it is also one of the most difficult to define.23 The guiding 
tenets of the drug war strategy have been the vision of a “drug free” society 
and the belief that vigorous enforcement of uncompromising criminal justice 
measures is the most effective method for realizing it.24 This philosophy has 
manifested itself in a focus on supply-side initiatives, on the theory that these 
efforts will suppress the market for drugs. Policies directly aimed at demand 
reduction have largely followed a similar rationale by addressing drug use and 
addiction problems primarily within the criminal justice system.  
This sort of description still does not tell us much about what differentiates 
the drug war from prewar prohibition, however. After all, laws criminalizing 
drug possession and distribution predate the modern war on drugs by at least 
half a century.25 Indeed, there is not even universal agreement about when the 
                                                                                                                     
 22 E.g., ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE 
PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 72 (2009) (“[T]he war on drugs 
resonates at the polls, or in negotiations with Congress, or in claims for public attention.”). 
 23 E.g., Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 
47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2002) (“[T]he ‘wars’ on drugs and terrorism appear the most 
amorphous and ambiguous of all . . . .”).  
 24 DAVID NUTT, DRUGS WITHOUT THE HOT AIR 268 (2012) (“What Nixon did was 
take this moralising approach to drugs—that they were inherently evil, and that our aim 
should be a ‘drug-free world’—and instigate a highly-combative set of policies in order to 
achieve it.”). 
 25 See generally Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of 
Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 586 (1973) (recounting the history 
of federal drug laws). 
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war began. Though federal drug prohibition has existed for nearly a century,26 
it was not until forty-five years ago that President Richard Nixon used the 
phrase “war on drugs” to describe America’s drug strategy.27 There is a 
debate, however, about whether to mark the start date for the drug war at 
Nixon’s statement or by some later development.28  
Those who believe it is a mistake to label Nixon the author of the modern 
war on drugs point out that federal drug funding was heavily weighted toward 
demand reduction during his administration.29 In the same speech where he 
described drug abuse as “public enemy number one,” Nixon also proposed a 
federal drug budget that allocated $105 million of $155 million to treatment 
and rehabilitation.30 As Michael Massing argued in his book, The Fix, 
although Nixon “had declared war on drugs,” he made “treatment his principal 
weapon.”31 Noted drug and alcohol historian David T. Courtwright has even 
referred to 1971 to 1973 as a “therapeutic golden age”32 for U.S. drug policy.  
Progressive federal drug policy reforms in the early 1970s were not 
limited to drug treatment. Even as “Nixon’s legislative message gave 
rhetorical priority to law enforcement,”33 strict federal mandatory minimum 
drug penalties that had been enacted in the 1950s34 were repealed under his 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Federal prohibition of opiates and coca compounds dates back to the Harrison Act 
of 1914 while the federal marijuana prohibition began in 1937 with the Marihuana Tax 
Act. See id. at 593, 600.  
 27 Sources are not in accord even as to the date of Nixon’s declaration. Compare 
Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NPR (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/sto 
ry/story.php?storyId=9252490 [https://perma.cc/56AG-LVS9] (identifying June 1971 as 
the date “Nixon officially declares a ‘war on drugs,’ identifying drug abuse as ‘public 
enemy No. 1’”), with WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 22, at 42 (“The first public use of 
the term ‘war on drugs’ by a president occurred in a speech delivered by Nixon in Laredo, 
Texas, on September 22, 1972.”). 
 28 Compare Conor Friedersdorf, The War on Drugs Turns 40, ATLANTIC (June 15, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/the-war-on-drugs-turns-40/240 
472/ [https://perma.cc/GJ4L-SBMA] (marking 1971 as the start of the war on drugs), with 
RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DISPARITY BY GEOGRAPHY: THE WAR ON 
DRUGS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (May 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ 
disparity-by-geography-the-war-on-drugs-in-americas-cities/ [https://perma.cc/XP88-
REZU] (describing 1980 as the “inception of the ‘war on drugs’”).  
 29 MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 273 (1998) (arguing for a return to the “67/33 
demand/supply split” in Nixon’s drug budgets). 
 30 Id. at 112. 
 31 Id. 
 32 DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, NO RIGHT TURN: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS IN A LIBERAL 
AMERICA 83 (2010). 
 33 Id. at 81. 
 34 See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA 
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 206–12 
(1974) (describing the passage of federal mandatory minimum drug sentencing provisions 
in the 1950s).  
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watch.35 Interestingly, among the legislators who spoke in favor of eliminating 
mandatory minimum drug sentences was then-Congressman George H.W. 
Bush, who argued that the change would “result in better justice and more 
appropriate sentences.”36  
On the other hand, the law that continues to serve as the foundation for 
federal drug policy was signed into law by Nixon. The Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970—the same bill that repealed 
mandatory minimum sentences—also instituted a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme for federal drug control in the form of the Controlled Substances 
Act.37 In the decades following the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, 
Congress had enacted “[a] patchwork of regulatory, revenue, and criminal 
measures” that featured “contorted presumptions and other awkward 
devices”38 (an approach necessitated by the narrow interpretation of the 
interstate commerce power that held sway at the time).39 As a result, by the 
late 1960s, opiates and cocaine were controlled by one law (the 1914 Harrison 
Act), marijuana by another (the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act), and hallucinogens, 
stimulants, and depressants by yet a third (the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 
under amendments passed in 1965).40 Still more federal drug statutes filled 
other regulatory gaps.41  
The 1970 Controlled Substances Act (CSA) cleared away nearly all then-
existing federal drug laws in favor of a single comprehensive statutory scheme 
to criminalize the possession, distribution, and manufacture of all drugs for 
recreational use.42 The CSA was designed to prevent the need for piecemeal 
legislation in the future by granting the U.S. Attorney General rule-making 
                                                                                                                     
 35 It is worth noting that, although Nixon signed off on the reform as part of an 
overhaul of federal drug laws, it was Congress that initiated the change. See 
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 32, at 82 (noting that congressional Democrats added provisions 
eliminating mandatory minimum sentences to the 1970 Controlled Substances Act). 
Nixon’s initial version of the bill largely would have “retained the penalty structure of the 
old laws, and even increased penalties for hallucinogen violations.” BONNIE & 
WHITEBREAD, supra note 34, at 244. 
 36 116 CONG. REC. 33314 (1970) (statement of Rep. George H.W. Bush), as reprinted 
in Footnote to History: The 1970 Views of Congressman George Bush on the Wisdom of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 108, 108 (1990). 
 37 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2012)). 
 38 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 34, at 242. 
 39 Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 25, at 593. 
 40 Id. at 586–605. 
 41 See id. (describing federal drug laws prior to the 1970 Controlled Substances Act).  
 42 See Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 
123, 126–28 (1980) (explaining that the CSA “ended the patchwork federal effort against 
drug abuse and signaled a national commitment to deal with this problem by committing 
federal funds for rehabilitation programs”). 
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authority to ban new substances administratively.43 None of the substances 
regulated by the CSA can be manufactured, possessed, or distributed for 
recreational purposes.44 As a result, the CSA established, for the first time, a 
standing federal policy of prohibition of the recreational market for all mind-
altering substances (with the exception of alcohol and tobacco, which 
Congress specifically exempted from the CSA).45  
Nixon also restructured the bureaucracy charged with enforcing federal 
drug laws by creating the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) via 
Executive Order in 1973.46 When Nixon took office, federal drug agencies 
were—much like the drug laws themselves—in a state of disarray.47 Nixon 
designed the DEA to be a “superagency to provide the momentum needed to 
coordinate all federal efforts related to drug enforcement” and to stop ongoing 
inter- and intra-agency disputes.48  
As part of this bureaucratic transformation, the federal drug control budget 
ballooned. In 1967, the primary federal agency tasked with drug control had a 
budget of only $3 million.49 By 1973, the DEA’s primary predecessor agency, 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), was operating on a 
$74 million budget.50 This money was put toward significantly expanding the 
ranks of drug enforcement agents and their footprint overseas.51 When Nixon 
came into office, the 300 federal drug “agents, spread over the nation and ten 
foreign countries, . . . [was] not much higher than [the number of federal drug 
agents] in the 1930s.”52 Between 1969 and 1973 alone, the federal government 
opened twenty-six new foreign drug enforcement offices53 and by the time the 
DEA was established, it inherited 1,470 special agents.54 During this 
expansion, the BNDD formed the first multijurisdictional law enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
 43 For an overview of the Controlled Substances Act’s classification scheme, see, for 
example, GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK 
§§ 1:1–:16 (2014–2015 ed.). 
 44 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
 45 Id. § 802(6).  
 46 Exec. Order No. 11,727, 38 Fed. Reg. 18357 (July 10, 1973). 
 47 See, e.g., G. GORDON LIDDY, WILL 188 (St. Martin’s Paperbacks ed. 1998) 
(describing how “constant feuding” between Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
and Customs agents “actually reached the point of shooting at each other from time to 
time”). 
 48 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION: A TRADITION OF EXCELLENCE 1973–2003, at 14 (2003). 
 49 PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION 
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 129 (2006).  
 50 Id. 
 51 ROBERT M. STUTMAN & RICHARD ESPOSITO, DEAD ON DELIVERY: INSIDE THE DRUG 
WARS, STRAIGHT FROM THE STREET 95 (1992). Nixon had given the DEA “a mandate to 
become narcotics cops for the world.” Id. at 91. 
 52 MUSTO, supra note 1, at 240. 
 53 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 48, at 7. 
 54 Id. at 4. 
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task force that pooled federal, state, and local resources in order to encourage 
increased involvement in drug enforcement at the local level.55  
It was not until the 1980s, however, that many of the laws and criminal 
justice outcomes that are most closely associated with the drug war really took 
shape. During the first few years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, federal 
funding for drug treatment programs was slashed to less than one-fourth of 
what it had been under Nixon.56 Journalist Dan Baum described the impact in 
stark terms: “With the 1982 budget came the beginning of the end of the 
federally funded drug treatment network that four drug czars had worked a 
decade to build.”57 Meanwhile, the federal drug enforcement budget enjoyed a 
substantial increase.58 By the time President George H.W. Bush left office, the 
DEA’s budget was more than ten times what it was when Reagan arrived in 
1981.59 
The increase in drug enforcement funding was accompanied by changes to 
federal drug laws, including the reintroduction of mandatory minimum 
sentencing. Beginning in 1984, and continuing for the rest of the decade, 
Congress passed a series of new mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses.60 Unlike the mandatory drug sentences of the 1950s, which had been 
“based upon the type of controlled substance and number of prior drug 
convictions,”61 the new provisions mostly pegged minimum sentences to drug 
quantity.62 In 1988, Congress expanded the reach of the mandatory minimum 
provisions to include attempts and conspiracies.63 The new mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Id. at 8.  
 56 MASSING, supra, note 29, at 161 (“In real terms, federal spending on treatment was 
less than one-fourth what it had been in 1974.”). 
 57 DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
FAILURE 144–45 (1996). 
 58 Id. at 145. 
 59 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 49 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 60 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–10 (Aug. 1991), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/man 
datory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GX4-P592] 
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS] (“Beginning in 1984, and every two years 
thereafter, Congress enacted an array of mandatory minimum penalties specifically 
targeted at drugs and violent crime.”). 
 61 William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on 
Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 318 (1993). 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 479–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(describing the passage of the law and the rationale for drug quantity-based sentencing). In 
addition to drug quantity-based mandatory minimums, federal law provides for mandatory 
minimum sentences in other circumstances, such as the carrying of a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). For an overview of federal 
mandatory minimum sentencing generally, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32040, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES (2013). 
 63 Wilkins et al., supra note 61, at 317–18. 
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minimum statutes led the U.S. Sentencing Commission to “jettison[] its data 
entirely and ma[k]e the quantity-based sentences…proportionately applicable 
to every drug trafficking offense.”64 In a 2004 report, the Sentencing 
Commission observed that “no other decision of the Commission has had such 
a profound impact on the federal prison population.”65 The result was a 
dramatic rise in the length of federal drug sentences,66 particularly for low-
level offenders. People involved at the periphery of drug operations—like 
lookouts, couriers, and street dealers—now faced steep sentences based on the 
type and amount of drugs involved in the offense.67 
The 1980s also saw the federal government develop incentives to enlist 
state and local law enforcement agencies in the drug war. As part of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress created a new federal grant program to 
fund state and local drug enforcement efforts,68 with a significant expansion in 
1988.69 The funds led to the proliferation of the multijurisdictional drug task 
forces first developed under Nixon.70 The number of task forces nearly 
doubled between 1988 and 1991 alone and they accounted for between 
220,000 and 280,000 arrests annually during that same period.71 Similarly, in 
1984, the federal government revised its asset forfeiture laws to give “state and 
local police agencies the lion’s share of seized assets even when federal agents 
were involved in the arrest.”72 Because state and local police are responsible 
for the vast majority of drug arrests, these policies were critical to developing 
the foot soldiers of the drug war.  
As a political issue, enthusiasm for the drug war probably hit its peak in 
the late 1980s. In 1989, a Gallup poll showed that more than six in ten 
Americans believed drug abuse to be “the most important problem facing this 
                                                                                                                     
 64 United States v. Diaz, No. 11–CR–00821–2(JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013). 




 66 Id. 
 67 Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How 
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 87, 106–08 (2003). 
 68 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 48, at 66. 
 69 TERENCE DUNWORTH ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE BYRNE FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM: A POLICY MAKER’S OVERVIEW, REPORT 4, at 1 
(Dec. 1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/163384NCJRS.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/3L5X-V2HA]. 
 70 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 71 Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 43 (1998); see also Sandra Guerra, The Myth of 
Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 
N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1182–83 (1995) (describing these task forces in greater detail). 
 72 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 71, at 51. 
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country today.”73 As the Los Angeles Times observed in connection with the 
poll, “[o]nly wars and economic disasters have registered such a large 
consensus in the past.”74 (The Times was referring to actual—not 
metaphorical—wars, of course.) In this environment, politicians were eager to 
constantly try to one-up each other in their commitment to getting tough on 
drugs.75 This led to a host of new war-era drug laws and programs, including 
the provision of military equipment to local police,76 the denial of public 
benefits based on drug convictions,77 and the widespread adoption of 
employee drug testing.78 The one notable exception to the steady stream of 
increasingly punitive drug policies during this period was the 1994 “safety 
valve” law, which created an exception to mandatory minimum drug penalties 
for offenders with very minimal criminal history who also meet a handful of 
other requirements.79  
During the mid-to-late-1990s and early 2000s, the war on drugs mostly 
faded into the political background, continuing to run on its own momentum 
under the already-established conceptual and legal framework. To be sure, 
Congress did not stop expanding the reach of federal drug penalties. But these 
new initiatives were focused at the margins, on issues like denying federal 
financial aid to students with drug convictions80 or extending the “Crack 
House Statute” to include concert promoters who knowingly allow drug use at 
their events.81  
                                                                                                                     
 73 Thomas B. Rosenstiel, 63% Call Drugs Nation’s Biggest Problem: Poll Finds 
Concern Soaring; Heavy Media Coverage Seen as Factor, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-14/news/mn-278_1_drug-abuse [https://perma.cc/85LU 
-Y8NY]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 For example, then-Senator Joe Biden’s critique of President George H.W. Bush’s 
drug policy was that Bush had not “spen[t] enough money on law enforcement, wasn’t 
tough enough on those addicted to drugs, [and] didn’t give the military enough power and 
money to fight illegal drugs.” BAUM, supra note 57, at 332. 
 76 See, e.g., RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP 139–75 (2014) (describing 
the militarization of domestic drug policing in the 1980s). 
 77 See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 23, at 1027. 
 78 See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Testing Drugs Versus Testing for Drug Use: Private 
Risk Management in the Shadow of Criminal Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 507, 509 (2007) 
(“According to the American Management Association, the proportion of its members 
using drug testing rose from 21% to 81% between 1987 and 1996.”). 
 79 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012). 
 80 Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the 
War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 68–71 (2002) 
(discussing a 1998 law barring students with drug convictions from receiving federal 
financial aid). 
 81 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012); see also Atossa Katharine Jackson, Note, Willful 
Blindness: The Threat to Innocent Property Owners of Recent Federal Drug Law 
Amendments, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 191, 195–98 (2008) (recounting the history of the 
law’s passage). 
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As this short history reveals, no single development definitively marks the 
beginning of the modern drug war. To be sure, there are a few points in time 
that one could cite for purposes of roughly measuring the drug war’s length—
Nixon’s initial declaration of war or the revival of mandatory minimums under 
Reagan, for example. But if the focus is on singling out the laws and policies 
that separate war-style prohibition from what came before, the picture is much 
more fluid. Nixon dramatically increased treatment funding and signed off on 
eliminating federal mandatory minimum drug penalties, two developments 
that would have been almost unthinkable by the mid-1980s. But Nixon also 
put in place much of the bureaucratic and ideological infrastructure of the drug 
war and “introduced a standing question into American politics, ‘How’s the 
president doing on drugs?’”82 Reagan and George H.W. Bush made the war on 
drugs a central focus of their administrations and translated Nixon’s rhetorical 
call to war into law, most notably with punitive federal drug sentencing laws 
and programs that incentivized local police to focus on drugs.83 By the time 
Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1992, the legal and bureaucratic 
architecture for the war on drugs was already firmly in place. Since then, war 
has continued to march on, less and less a political focal point over time but 
still an ingrained part of the national political landscape.  
III. THE LINE BETWEEN DRUG WAR AND DRUG TRUCE 
An understanding of how the drug war developed over time is only a small 
step in trying to disentangle the drug war from non-war prohibition. Any 
attempt to define the drug war must inevitably focus on identifying its 
distinguishing characteristics. This Part draws out the features that separate the 
drug war from regular drug prohibition. I begin with the ideology of the drug 
war, which is distinct from the ideology of standard drug prohibition. I then 
highlight three concrete measures that have stood out in the drug war-era and 
that are often the focus of attention from drug war critics: arrests, 
incarceration, and racial disparities in enforcement. To be clear, this is not 
meant to be a comprehensive list of all of the drug war’s attributes, something 
that would include a number of other items such as the militarization of 
domestic policing. Rather, my goal in this Part is to identify the core of what 
divides between the drug war and prewar prohibition.84  
                                                                                                                     
 82 COURTWRIGHT, supra note 32, at 161. 
 83 KING, supra note 28, at 3 (“While President Nixon may have led the effort to 
prioritize drug enforcement policy nationally, it was the administrations of Presidents 
Reagan, Bush and Clinton that oversaw a historic redeployment of American law 
enforcement to target drug offenses.”). 
 84 Despite the wealth of literature on the war against drugs, the question of how to 
define the drug war has been largely overlooked. As Corey Rayburn Yung has observed, 
“There is almost no theoretical work concerning when ordinary law enforcement escalates 
into a criminal war. While many scholars have written about the War on Drugs, a general 
war on crime, or other specific criminal wars, the definition of a ‘criminal war’ has largely 
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A. Rhetoric and Ideology 
The war on drugs has been held together by rhetoric and ideology as much 
as anything else.85 Labeling our drug policy a war has signaled that it is 
something more than just prohibition for the sake of public health. War is a 
life and death struggle against an enemy. The only acceptable outcome is 
defeating the enemy, in this case drugs and drug use.86 And, because the stakes 
of war are so high, we must pursue that goal at almost any cost. The war has 
been waged with a single-minded focus on reducing all illegal drug use, 
sometimes articulated as an idealized vision of a drug free society.87 This 
outlook concerns itself with “the consumption of the prohibited substance 
rather than any secondary consequences that might” result.88 Unlike, for 
example, Britain’s 1980s drug strategies, which focused on goals like reducing 
the health risks and consequences of drug use, the U.S. drug war always had 
“one overarching goal—the reduction of drug use.”89  
Over time, the rhetoric and ideology of war permeated nearly all of our 
drug laws and enforcement strategies.90 It drove the adoption of harsh and 
inflexible policies, like mandatory minimum sentencing laws. But just as 
important, policy ideas thought to be inconsistent with the drug war’s use 
reduction goal—like needle exchange or medical marijuana—came to be 
                                                                                                                     
been taken for granted.” Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex 
Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 437 (2010) (footnotes omitted). Yung 
proposes the “three essential elements of a criminal war” include “marshalling of 
resources, myth creation, and exception making.” Id. at 440. Yung makes a strong case for 
these elements as preconditions to a criminal war. Once a criminal war is as far along as 
the drug war, however, resources, myths, and exceptions have long since given birth to 
concrete policies, which is the focus of this Part and the next. 
 85 See WILLIAM N. ELWOOD, RHETORIC IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 3 (1994) (“[T]he War 
on Drugs is a rhetorical, multifaceted public relations campaign . . . .”). 
 86 As President George H.W. Bush put it, “Victory—victory over drugs—is our cause, 
a just cause. And with your help, we are going to win.” WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 
22, at 64 (quoting President George H.W. Bush). 
 87 Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have described this as a “legalist 
perspective” in discussing the “powerful role of ideology in drug policy choice in the 
United States.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL 
DRUG CONTROL 4 (1992). 
 88 Id. at 9. 
 89 Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Setting Goals for Drug Policy: Harm 
Reduction or Use Reduction?, 92 ADDICTION 1143, 1144 (1997) (quoting the Clinton 
Administration’s drug strategies). For a comparison of drug policy goals and rhetoric in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, see generally Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in 
Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. 
REV. 261 (2010). 
 90 See WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 22, at 150 (“[P]residential rhetoric has a 
positive and significant effect on the percentage of arrests composed of narcotics cases.”). 
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considered “treason” because they might amount to a sort of concession to the 
enemy.91  
Former drug czar William J. Bennett, for example, described the 
placement of ballot measures “to decrease penalties for possession of 
marijuana” in early 2000s in Arizona, Nevada, and Ohio as “the drug 
legalization movement’s advance on the[] home fronts” of those states.92 “We 
should not capitulate in our war on drugs any more than we should surrender 
in our war on terrorism,” Bennett argued.93 And according to Bennett, “[t]he 
forms of surrender are manifold.”94 They include “[b]uzzwords like ‘harm 
reduction’ [which] crowd[] out clear no-use messages,” allowing for the 
medicinal use of marijuana, and even the release of the film Traffic for having 
“portrayed the war on drugs as a futile effort.”95  
If we are fighting a war against drugs, the only acceptable policies are 
those that further the goal of a drug free society.96 While it is possible to have 
drug prohibition alongside programs like heroin maintenance or needle 
exchange, these ideas are incompatible with the drug war.97 This is because 
the drug war requires a uniformity of purpose that a non-war form of 
prohibition does not. As Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese told a group 
of newspaper editors in the 1980s, in the war against drugs “there are no 
neutrals.”98  
The war metaphor also signifies the intensity with which we should pursue 
the goal of reducing all drug use and the sorts of sacrifices or “collateral 
damage” we should accept.99 Drug prohibition is agnostic on questions like 
how much punishment drug offenders should receive or how we should rank 
drug investigations relative to other law enforcement priorities. But in a drug 
                                                                                                                     
 91 See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN ET AL., DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY 137 (2011) (stating that 
the possibility that “some abusable drugs bring benefits” is “treason in the ‘war on 
drugs’”). 
 92 William J. Bennett, Don’t Put Up with Pot, Ohio, CIN. POST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 14A. 
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 94 William J. Bennett, No Retreat, No Surrender: President Bush Signals a Renewed 
Offensive on Several Fronts in the Languishing War on Drugs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
May 20, 2001, at G1. 
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 97 See, e.g., Press Release, John Ashcroft, Senator, to President Clinton, Shalala: No 
Federal Funds for Needle Exchange (Mar. 31, 1998) (“The Administration’s interest in 
clean needles is a terrifying indicator of bow [sic] eager it is to surrender in the ‘War on 
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 98 BAUM, supra note 57, at 214 (quoting Ed Meese). 
 99 Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839, 
839–40 (2002). 
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war, drug crime is an offense “of the highest order”100—“a threat worse than 
any nuclear warfare or any chemical warfare waged on any battlefield.”101  
Drug trafficking was officially declared “a threat to national security” by 
the Reagan Administration in 1986.102 Cities became drug war 
“battlefield[s]”103 to be policed by militaristic equipment and tactics.104 
Exceptions to constitutional protections could be justified on the theory that 
“all bets are off and government may do whatever is necessary to ensure the 
nation’s continued prosperity.”105  
President George H.W. Bush’s first drug czar even went so far as to 
question the idea of due process for drug offenders, remarking that “[i]t’s a 
funny war when the ‘enemy’ is entitled to due process of law and a fair 
trial.”106 And who is the enemy? “Let me tell you straight out,” Bush said in 
1989.107 “Everyone who uses drugs. Everyone who sells drugs. And everyone 
who looks the other way.”108 This is the sort of atmosphere that led Congress 
to vote to double crack cocaine sentences “simply to symbolize redoubled 
Congressional seriousness.”109  
In sum, it is hard to overstate the importance of rhetoric and ideology in 
driving and defining the war on drugs. This is what made adopting harsh drug 
policies a political and moral imperative in the 1980s and 1990s, regardless of 
the public policy merits. For this reason, moving away from the rhetoric and 
                                                                                                                     
 100 People v. Profit, 229 Cal. Rptr. 148, 159 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 101 BAUM, supra note 57, at 231 (quoting Thomas Hartnett, former South Carolina 
Congressman). 
 102 MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD’S GREATEST OUTLAW 
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security.”). 
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61 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000). 
 105 Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 787 (2002). 
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RAIDS IN AMERICA 17 (2006) (quoting William J. Bennett, The Top Drug Warrior Talks 
Tough, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 1990, at 74), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ 
balko_whitepaper_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ5P-C8C3]. 
 107 BAUM, supra note 57, at 289 (quoting President George H.W. Bush). 
 108 Id. (quoting President George H.W. Bush). 
 109 United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 784 (E.D. Mo.) (quoting testimony of 
Eric E. Sterling, President, Criminal Justice Policy Foundation) (describing the process in 
which Congress decided to increase the cocaine to crack sentencing ratio from the proposal 
of 50:1 to 100:1), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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political posture of war is an important part of achieving a drug truce. This is 
particularly true in light of the decentralized nature of drug control, which has 
made the bully pulpit a critical tool for influencing state and local entities to 
help fight the war.110 To be sure, a shift in rhetoric alone does nothing to 
change the observable effects of the drug war (such as arrests, incarceration, 
and racial disparity). But a drug policy dialogue that takes place using the 
language of public health and public policy—and not the language of war—is 
essential to freeing decision makers to rethink laws like mandatory minimums 
or to consider previously off-limits ideas like heroin assisted treatment.  
B. Arrests 
There is perhaps no clearer manifestation of the drug war ideology than 
the strategy of “seek[ing] out and punish[ing] casual, nonaddicted drug 
users.”111 In 1970, when the Controlled Substances Act was passed, there were 
a little more than 400,000 drug arrests nationwide.112 This number climbed 
quickly during the Nixon administration, to over 600,000 by 1974, followed 
by a period of relative stability until 1980.113 Then, beginning in 1980, drug 
arrests rose fairly steadily and dramatically, from 581,000 to a height of almost 
1.9 million in 2005.114 Drug arrests have declined somewhat since, with just 
over 1.5 million in 2013.115 But there are still two and a half times as many 
drug arrests annually today as in 1980.116  
Drug arrests did not just increase on their own terms but relative to overall 
arrest numbers. Drug offenses were 5.9% of all arrests in the United States in 
1980 and 11.1% of all arrests by 1990.117 In 2013, 13.3% of all arrests in the 
United States were for drugs.118 Some years saw more arrests for drugs than 
                                                                                                                     
 110 See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 820 
(2004) (“The federal government exercises influence over state and local policymaking 
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 111 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 16. 
 112 KING, supra note 28, at 5. 
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 115 Fed. Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crime in the United States 
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for any other single category of crime—in 2006, for example, arrests for drugs 
topped all categories at 1,889,810 arrests, with the next closest group, property 
offenses, at 1,540,297 arrests.119  
Also notable is that arrests for simple possession—particularly marijuana 
possession—were chiefly responsible for the rise in drug arrests after 1990. 
Indeed, arrests for drug sale or manufacture actually declined at a slow but 
fairly steady pace between 1990 and 2010.120 There were 13% fewer 
trafficking arrests in 2010 (302,300 arrests) than there were in 1990 (347,900 
arrests).121 In stark contrast, drug possession arrests were about 80% higher 
during that same period (1,336,530 arrests in 2010 versus 741,600 arrests in 
1990).122 In terms of drug type, marijuana was the main focus. Between 1990 
and 2002, marijuana possession was responsible for 78.7% of the 450,000 
additional drug arrests.123 While arrests for all offenses decreased by 3% 
during that period, marijuana arrests rose by 113%.124  
C. Incarceration 
As John Pfaff has persuasively argued, the impact of drug enforcement on 
the U.S. prison population is often overstated.125 But it is hard to exaggerate 
the importance of incarceration in distinguishing the drug war era from prewar 
prohibition. Indeed, the post-1980 increase in drug prisoners is in many ways 
even more striking than the rise in drug arrests. Between 1980 and 2005, drug 
                                                                                                                     
 119 Fed. Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Table 29: Estimated Number 
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arrests tripled.126 During that same period, the number of drug offenders in 
prisons and jails increased by 1100%, from 41,100 in 1980 to 493,800 in 
2005.127 By the time President Obama took office, the number of Americans 
incarcerated for drug offenses was larger than the entire United States prison 
and jail population had been in 1980.128  
A number of factors appear to have contributed to the rise in drug 
incarcerations. In addition to the increase in drug arrests, the drug war saw a 
greater proportion of people convicted of drug offenses receive prison 
sentences.129 The average sentence for drug offenders also increased by 17% 
between 1988 and 2004.130 Meanwhile, “the expansion of mandatory 
minimum sentencing and the abolition of parole” meant that people ended up 
serving a longer portion of those sentences than they might have in the past.131 
Looking outside the United States helps to highlight the difference 
between our drug war and non-war drug prohibition when it comes to 
imprisonment. While drugs are prohibited in nearly every country in the 
world, “[t]he United States stands out relative to other developed countries for 
the intensity with which it enforces drug laws.”132 A 2011 study comparing the 
criminal justice policies of the United States to five other countries, for 
example, showed that we have a much higher drug imprisonment rate than the 
others.133 At the time of the study, drug offenders accounted for 24% of the 
United States prison population, compared to 16.8% in England and Wales, 
15.2% in Finland, 10% in Australia, and 5.6% in Canada.134 And, of course, 
the slice of drug offenders in the United States comes from a bigger pie than in 
the other nations. At the time of the study, the overall incarceration rate in the 
United States was five times as high as in England and Wales and eleven times 
as high as in Finland.135  
                                                                                                                     
 126 MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: 
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/ND73-N3KN]. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Alex Kreit, Toward a Public Health Approach to Drug Policy, ADVANCE, Spring 
2009, at 43 n.5.  
 129 MAUER & KING, supra note 126, at 7. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 KLEIMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 48. 
 133 JUSTICE POLICY INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS 
BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS 23 (Apr. 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.or 
g/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/finding_direction-full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CY 
2-7RXT].  
 134 Id. at 26. 
 135 Id. at 10; see also, e.g., DAVE BEWLEY-TAYLOR ET AL., THE BECKLEY FOUND., THE 
INCARCERATION OF DRUG OFFENDERS 4 (Mar. 2009), http://beckleyfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/BF_Report_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AZX-SVT8]. 
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D. Racial Disparities 
Race has been closely linked to drug prohibition long before the modern 
war on drugs. Indeed, many early drug laws were passed expressly for the 
purpose of discriminating against minority populations. An 1886 court opinion 
considering the constitutionality of a ban on opium dens, for example, 
observed that the law “proceeds more from a desire to vex and annoy the 
‘Heathen Chinee’ [sic] . . . than to protect the people from the evil habit.”136 
Similarly, a 1929 hearing at the Montana state legislature on marijuana 
prohibition featured testimony from a doctor who joked that  
[w]hen some beet field peon takes a few rares of this stuff, . . . [h]e thinks he 
has just been elected president of Mexico so he starts out to execute all his 
political enemies. I understand that over in Butte where the Mexicans often 
go for the winter they stage imaginary bullfights in the ‘Bower of Roses’ or 
put on tournaments for the favor of ‘Spanish Rose’ after a couple of whiffs of 
Marijuana.137  
Though this sort of overt racism is mostly absent from the modern drug 
war,138 the disproportionate impact of drug enforcement on people of color is 
in many ways just as troubling. About 12.6% of the U.S. population is 
African-American,139 and blacks use drugs at about the same rate as whites.140 
                                                                                                                     
 136 Ex parte Yung Jon, 28 F. 308, 312 (D. Ore. 1886). 
 137 Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree 
of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 
VA. L. REV. 971, 1014 (1970) (quoting Byron E. Cooney, Legislative Ground Sluice from 
Last Chance Gulch, MONT. STANDARD, Jan. 27, 1929, at 1, 13).   
 138 But see, e.g., David A. Graham, Paul LePage’s Racist Fearmongering on Drugs, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/racial-
dogwhistling-with-paul-lepage-still-americas-most-outlandish-governor/423246/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/QP85-RNTU] (reporting that the governor of Maine described heroin sellers as 
“guys by the name D-Money, Smoothie, Shifty” who “come from Connecticut and New 
York” to sell heroin and “half the time they impregnate a young, white girl before they 
leave” (quoting Governor Paul LePage)). Although race was not publicly cited as a reason 
to declare war on drugs, the launch of the modern war against drugs was very closely 
linked to racial politics—specifically, the backlash to the civil rights movement. See, e.g., 
DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 7 (2007) 
(“The contemporary war on drugs followed suspiciously close on the heels of the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970s, and, in a certain sense, grew out of it. Fear 
of urban disorder and rising crime rates were part of the backlash to the civil rights 
movement that fueled get-tough, ‘law and order’ policies designed to increase incarceration 
rates for street crime and drugs.”); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 59, at 40–57 
(providing a history of the links between race and the politics of criminal justice following 
the 1960s).  
 139 KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-02, OVERVIEW OF RACE 
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 tbl.1 (Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/b 
riefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY3G-6EJS]. 
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We do not have much data on the racial composition of drug dealers, but the 
evidence that does exist “suggests a racial breakdown among sellers similar to 
that among users.”141 And yet, 30.4% of drug arrestees in 2013 were black.142 
The disparity grows even wider when it comes to incarceration. As of 2012, 
37.7% of state drug prisoners were black.143  
A 2013 report by the American Civil Liberties Union examining 
disparities in arrests for marijuana found that a black person is 3.73 times more 
likely to be arrested for possession of marijuana than a white person, and that 
the disparity had increased 32.7% between 2001 and 2010.144 Indeed, the 
ACLU found that during this period, the white arrest rate for marijuana 
possession had “remained constant at around 192 per 100,000, whereas the 
Black arrest rate has risen from 537 per 100,000 in 2001 . . . to 716 per 
100,000 in 2010.”145 In other words, the increase in marijuana possession 
arrests between 2001 and 2010 was almost entirely due to an increase in 
arrests of African-Americans for marijuana. 
These data points, which only scratch the surface of disparities in drug 
enforcement, highlight the central place of race in any description or definition 
of the drug war. In her book The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander argues 
that “[n]othing has contributed more to the systematic mass incarceration of 
people of color in the United States than the War on Drugs.”146 Whether or not 
this is so,147 there is no doubt that drug laws are not enforced equally and that, 
for many drug war critics, this is one of the most objectionable aspects of the 
war on drugs. 
                                                                                                                     
 140 Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 257, 266–67 (2009) (“[B]lacks account for 13% of the total who have ever 
used an illicit drug.”). 
 141 Id. at 268; see also, e.g., Rothwell, supra note 119 (“[A]nalysis of data from the 
2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health shows that 6.6 percent of white adolescents 
and young adults (aged 12 to 25) sold drugs, compared to just 5.0 percent of blacks (a 32 
percent difference).”).  
 142 Fed. Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crime in the United States 
2013: Table 43: Arrests by Race, FBI: UCR, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/6UBU-9DG3]; see 
also Fellner, supra note 140, at 272–73 (2009) (reviewing drug arrest rates by race from 
1980 to 2007). 
 143 E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247282, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 16 
tbl.14 (Sept. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/R72S-
6M4G]. 
 144 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 
(June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/SMN5-GBRQ]. 
 145 Id. at 20. 
 146 ALEXANDER, supra note 59, at 60.  
 147 For an argument that drug incarcerations have only a “minor effect . . . on the racial 
compositions of prisons,” see John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: 
Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 184 (2015). 
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IV. TOWARD A DRUG TRUCE 
The discussion so far has attempted to sketch out a line between the drug 
war and prewar drug prohibition. Admittedly, it is far from a bright line. 
Perhaps the easiest part of the drug war to pin down is its ideology—the 
almost single-minded focus on reducing drug availability and use; the vision 
of “a Drug-Free America.”148 Over time, this vision produced a wide array of 
ever tougher laws and policies. The result was a form of drug prohibition that 
looked noticeably different from drug prohibition in most other countries.149 
The drug war era saw a dramatic jump in drug arrests and incarcerations. And 
racial disparities in drug enforcement have persisted and in some cases 
increased, even as it became less and less “socially permissible to use race, 
explicitly, as a justification for discrimination, exclusion, and social 
contempt.”150 To be sure, some readers are bound to consider one or more 
other traits to be as essential as the ones I’ve identified—drug treatment 
funding or police militarization, for example. But these characteristics—
ideology, arrests, incarcerations, and racial disparity—are likely to figure 
prominently in almost anyone’s definition of the drug war.  
With the drug war’s defining features now in sharper focus, this Article 
turns to the matter of an exit strategy. The next Parts examine the legal and 
policy reform efforts that are currently underway and their potential to achieve 
measurable results toward reducing drug arrests and incarcerations, and 
eliminating racial disparities in drug enforcement. As the discussion will 
reveal, making progress toward these goals will take more than a few pieces of 
legislation. Even if there were universal agreement on an objective like cutting 
drug prisoners by half, working toward it would require the coordinated effort 
of federal, state, and local officials. The decentralized nature of drug 
enforcement in the United States means that, much like the rise of the war on 
drugs, its end will come slowly over time, as a result of a range of national, 
state, and legal and policy reforms. Beyond measurable characteristics like 
arrests and incarcerations, there is the question of ideology. Agreement that 
the drug war should end and that we should reduce drug arrests and 
incarcerations is not the same thing as agreement about what a postwar drug 
strategy should look like. Some drug war opponents would like to see all drugs 
legalized. Others vigorously oppose legalizing even marijuana. Is it possible to 
identify principles that people in both of these camps can agree on to guide us 
toward a drug truce? 
                                                                                                                     
 148 See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 15–17 (quoting THE WHITE 
HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 9 (Sept. 1989)). 
 149 See Caulkins & Reuter, supra note 89, at1143–44 (comparing the United States’ 
1988 drug strategy, which focused exclusively on drug use reduction, to Britain’s, whose 
goals included “reduc[ing] the health risks and other damage related to drug misuse”). 
 150 ALEXANDER, supra note 59, at 2 (“Rather than rely on race, we use our criminal 
justice system to label people of color ‘criminals’ and then engage in all the practices we 
supposedly left behind.”). 
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The remainder of this Article tackles these questions and proceeds as 
follows. First, I briefly outline the major drug policy reform efforts to date as 
background for the discussion that follows. Then, I revisit the measurable 
characteristics identified above (arrests, incarceration, and racial disparities) 
and consider the challenges and strategies for achieving meaningful reform in 
each area. Finally, I conclude by proposing three principles to help guide 
postwar drug policy.  
A. Current Reform Efforts 
As discussed in the introduction, in less than a decade, the drug war has 
gone from near universal support among elected officials to near universal 
condemnation. Prominent leaders from across the ideological spectrum have 
loudly embraced the goal of ending the drug war. Even drug warriors no 
longer talk about the war in the present tense. In a recent editorial, two former 
drug czars called on the country to “[b]ring back the war on drugs.”151  
Notwithstanding the rhetorical shift, federal drug laws and macro-level 
budget priorities have hardly changed at all over the past few decades.152 At 
the state level, however, the picture is much different. Voters began passing 
state medical marijuana legalization laws in 1996.153 Today, marijuana is legal 
for all adult use in eight states, with four marijuana legalization ballot 
measures enacted in November 2016, as this Article was nearing press.154 
These state marijuana laws have generated a great deal of news coverage and 
political attention. But the state-level drug law reform trend is not limited to 
marijuana. A Pew Research Center analysis found that “40 states took some 
                                                                                                                     
 151 William J. Bennett & John P. Walters, Bring Back the War on Drugs, BOS. GLOBE 
(Sept. 8, 2015) (emphasis added), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/09 
/08/bring-back-war-drugs/h2wWV7ojkje4P5dwIbmgPK/story.html [https://perma.cc/EP7V 
-U7XY]. 
 152 E.g., Reuter, supra note 5, at 75 (“Though almost universally criticized as overly 
punitive, expensive, racially disparate in impact, and ineffective, American drug policy 
remained largely unchanged from 1980 to 2010.”). 
 153 Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their Own?, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1796–97 (2003) (discussing California’s enactment of the 
Compassionate Use Act in 1996). 
 154 Colorado and Washington were the first states to pass legalization laws, in 2012, 
with Oregon and Alaska following suit in 2014. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; ALASKA 
STAT. § 17.38.060 (2015) (codifying Ballot Measure No. 2); Initiative 502, 2013 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 28 (codified as amended in scattered chapters of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46, 69); 
Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, H.B. 3400, 78th 
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada all 
passed ballot measures legalizing marijuana in November 2016. See Christopher Ingraham, 
Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-
victory-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/2DEF-MNJF] (reporting on the election results). 
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action to ease their drug laws” between 2009 and 2013.155 These reforms 
ranged from ameliorating the collateral consequences of a drug conviction to 
repealing mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws.156 More recently, a 
number of states have passed legislative packages to address the spike in 
opiate use based on a harm reduction model. Vermont, for example, enacted a 
slate of reforms that included a “good Samaritan law [that] shield[s] heroin 
users from arrest when they call an ambulance to help someone who’s 
overdosed.”157  
At the federal level, the only significant legislative reform thus far has 
been the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the disparity between 
federal crack and powder cocaine sentencing provisions from 100-to-1 to 18-
to-1.158 There is more to the story than federal drug statutes, however. In 2014, 
the United States Sentencing Commission adopted an amendment to the 
federal drug sentencing guidelines that is anticipated to reduce the average 
federal drug trafficking sentence by eleven months, or 17.7%.159 And, over the 
past three years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued a handful of 
significant enforcement policies concerning drug laws. The most well known 
of these was the DOJ’s August 2013 memorandum advising federal 
prosecutors not to interfere with state marijuana legalization laws.160 The 
guidance does not bind federal prosecutors or grant any legally enforceable 
rights to state-compliant marijuana operators. But, so far, federal officials have 
                                                                                                                     
 155 Drew DeSilver, Feds May Be Rethinking the Drug War, but States Have Been 
Leading the Way, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/04/02/feds-may-be-rethinking-the-drug-war-but-states-have-been-leading-the-
way/ [https://perma.cc/64KP-CY9N]. 
 156 See generally SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 20 (providing an overview of 
state-level drug policy reforms since 2009). 
 157 Josh Eidelson, Vermont Quits War on Drugs to Treat Heroin Abuse as Health 
Issue, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-
22/vermont-quits-war-on-drugs-to-treat-heroin-abuse-as-health-issue [https://perma.cc/4RF 
4-YUYH]. 
 158 See Sarah Hyser, Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal 
Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 503, 
504 (2012) (discussing the Fair Sentencing Act). 
 159 Notice of Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 25996, 26005 (May 6, 2014) (adopted in U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(c) (Nov. 2015)). 
 160 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys, 
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/66CW-254Y] (encouraging prosecutorial discretion against enforcement of federal 
marijuana prohibitions in states that have legalized marijuana unless the relevant state’s 
regulatory system inappropriately interferes with certain federal priorities listed in the 
memorandum). 
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mostly abided by it.161 Although it did not receive as much media attention, 
also in August 2013, the DOJ released a memorandum advising federal 
prosecutors not to apply mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws in certain 
cases.162 In November 2014, the DOJ announced it would stop using “number 
of arrests” to measure the success of state and local police who have received 
federal Byrne Justice Assistance Grants.163 And in January 2015, then-
Attorney General Eric Holder issued an order limiting (at least to some 
extent)164 the use of federal forfeiture “adoptions,”165 a procedure often used 
by state and local police to circumvent stricter state forfeiture laws.166  
The DOJ’s policies could be rescinded at any time and are, in most cases, 
only advisory. But a handful of proposals to change federal drug laws have 
gained traction in Congress, particularly with respect to mandatory minimum 
sentencing. In 2015, “Congress seemed on the brink of enacting significant 
limitations on the use of mandatory minimum sentences and of providing the 
beginnings of a more flexible, generous mechanism for back-end release of 
federal prisoners.”167 Bipartisan sentencing reform proposals ranged from the 
Smarter Sentencing Act, which would have cut many mandatory minimum 
                                                                                                                     
 161 See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. 
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nonenforcement policy). 
 162 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to the U.S. Att’ys and Assistant Att’y 
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OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 25 (Mar. 2010), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_p 
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forfeiture). 
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Sentencing Legislation, December 2015, 28 FED. SENT’G. REP. 105, 105 (2015). 
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drug penalties in half and relaxed one of the requirements for the safety valve 
(a provision that allows qualifying defendants to be sentenced below an 
otherwise applicable mandatory minimum provision),168 to the Justice Safety 
Valve Act, which would have given judges the authority to sentence below 
any mandatory minimum upon a finding that it was warranted by sentencing 
objectives.169 Notwithstanding broad bipartisan support for reform, the 
Chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees—Charles Grassley 
(Republican, Iowa) and Bob Goodlatte (Republican, Virginia)—were 
unwilling to allow any of the original proposals to move through the 
legislature.170 At the beginning of 2016 it appeared that a compromise 
proposal, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act,171 was poised to make 
its way through Congress.172 But by late May 2016, a leading sentence reform 
opponent, Senator Tom Cotton (Republican, Arkansas), pronounced the effort 
“dead in this year’s Congress.”173 Nevertheless, with “near universality of 
support for significant reform”174 in Congress, it is likely the issue will 
continue to receive serious consideration. While sentencing reform has 
enjoyed the most momentum in Congress, legislative proposals to move away 
from the drug war have extended to other areas as well. The bipartisan Fifth 
Amendment Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act, for example, would make a 
number of substantial reforms to asset forfeiture, including raising the federal 
government’s burden of proof for seizing assets and redirecting seized assets 
from the Attorney General’s coffers to the Treasury’s General Fund.175  
These developments suggest that the rhetoric in favor of “ending the drug 
war” has already given way to real changes in many states and is slowly 
starting to result in action at the federal level. But even if Congress were to 
pass laws to reduce mandatory minimum drug penalties and the use of asset 
                                                                                                                     
 168 Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015); Smarter Sentencing 
Act of 2015, H.R. 920, 114th Cong. (2015).  
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forfeiture, they may only have a modest impact on drug policy nationwide. 
This is because, although it is often thought of as a national policy, the war on 
drugs is mostly waged at the state and local levels. Indeed, local control over 
enforcement (in the form of police and prosecutorial discretion) is such that 
state-level criminal justice reforms do not always see significant results. As 
discussed below, the complex relationship between federal, state, and local 
drug enforcement presents challenges for tackling the key characteristics of the 
drug war—arrests, incarceration, and racial disparity—in a coordinated way. 
To be sure, there are strategies for achieving progress in each area. But ending 
the drug war will take much more than changes to a few federal drug laws.  
B. Arrests 
A coordinated effort to reduce drug arrests will be very difficult to put 
together. Because drug enforcement decisions take place at the local level, the 
head of the DEA cannot simply adopt a new enforcement initiative that would 
dramatically cut the number of drug arrests nationwide. The year 2013 saw 1.5 
million arrests for drug offenses.176 That same year, federal prosecutors filed 
charges in 29,094 drug cases177—one-third of the federal criminal docket but a 
tiny fraction of drug enforcement nationwide. As Keith Humphreys has 
explained, “arresting drug users is almost entirely a state and local function in 
the United States” and so “[t]he opinions of mayors and police chiefs in cities 
such as New York and Los Angeles are much more important drivers of, for 
example, marijuana possession arrest rates, than are the opinions of a U.S. 
President.”178 A 2008 report by Ryan King, Disparity by Geography: The War 
on Drugs in America’s Cities, took an in-depth look at how “local decision 
making plays a defining role in shaping [drug] arrest patterns.”179 The study 
revealed dramatic differences in drug arrest rates from city to city.180 As an 
example, drug arrests in Fort Worth rose 81% between 1980 and 2003 but 
declined by 42% in neighboring Dallas.181 
Indeed, even state legislatures and state attorneys general have relatively 
little control over drug arrest rates. New York provides a striking example. 
Even though the New York legislature decriminalized simple possession of the 
drug in 1977, the New York City Police Department made over 400,000 
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 177 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-2—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
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marijuana possession arrests between 2002 and 2011.182 To accomplish this, 
New York City police tricked suspects into taking marijuana out of their 
pockets, allowing them to make arrests for possession of marijuana “open to 
public view,” which remains a misdemeanor.183  
Of course, the power of local control works both ways. If states or 
localities want to reduce or withdraw from drug enforcement, there is little the 
federal government can do to stop them. There is no better evidence of this 
than state medical and adult-use marijuana legalization laws, which the federal 
government was unable to effectively block despite its best efforts.184 States 
that have legalized marijuana have, not surprisingly, seen marijuana arrests 
plummet.185 With marijuana arrests accounting for about half of all drug 
arrests every year,186 the spread of state marijuana legalization laws alone 
would go a long way toward reducing the drug arrest rate. Legalization is not a 
viable option for other drugs. But local changes, from diversion programs to a 
simple reallocation of police department resources, can significantly reduce 
drug arrests. Indeed, while the number of drug arrests today is striking, it is 
well off of its peak from 2006.187  
Achieving sustained progress in reducing drug arrests will require going 
beyond piecemeal reform, however. Although the vast majority of drug 
enforcement is in local hands, it is not entirely beyond the federal 
government’s control. Indeed, a key development in the war on drugs was the 
rise of federal programs designed to enlist state and local police in the fight. In 
the early 1980s, “[m]any state and local law enforcement officials were less 
than pleased” with the federal government’s drug war, “viewing [it] as an 
unwelcome distraction.”188 In order to “build a consensus among state and 
local law enforcement agencies that the drug war should be a top priority in 
                                                                                                                     
 182 See Ari Rosmarin, Note, The Phantom Defense: The Unavailability of the 
Entrapment Defense in New York City “Plain View” Marijuana Arrests, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 
189, 191–92 (2012). 
 183 Id. at 190.  
 184 See generally Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana 
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 
(2009) (describing how the U.S. federal system allows the states to pursue different drug 
policies from the federal government, even when those policies conflict with federal 
policy). 
 185 E.g., Christopher Ingraham, After Legalization, Colorado Pot Arrests Plunge, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/26 
/after-legalization-colorado-pot-arrests-plunge/ [https://perma.cc/KYL9-NUVZ]; see also 
DRUG POLICY ALL., STATUS REPORT: MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION IN WASHINGTON AFTER 1 
YEAR OF RETAIL SALES AND 2.5 YEARS OF LEGAL POSSESSION (July 2015), 
https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug_Policy_Alliance_Status_Report_Marij
uana_Legalization_in_Washington_July2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXP3-L999]. 
 186 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 144, at 4. 
 187 See SNYDER, supra note 120, at 12. 
 188 ALEXANDER, supra note 59, at 73. 
2016] DRUG TRUCE 1351 
their hometowns,” the federal government provided cash incentives.189 
Specifically, the federal government encourages state and local police to work 
on drug enforcement through grants, asset forfeiture, and multijurisdictional 
task forces.190 
Drug enforcement intensity is particularly susceptible to these sorts of 
incentives because it is mostly police-driven. Unlike a robbery investigation, 
which begins when a victim reports the crime, drug investigations almost 
always start with the police. As one law enforcement textbook puts it, 
“[f]requently . . . drug enforcement agents must initiate their own cases with 
few initial leads.”191 For this reason, decisions like how many officers to 
assign to a drug task force or whether or not to direct officers to ask for 
consent to search during a traffic stop play a critical role in drug arrest rates. 
While local sentiment certainly influences these sorts of law enforcement 
choices, so do federal incentive programs.  
Another reason federal drug enforcement funding can be especially 
impactful on local arrest numbers relates to the “correctional free lunch” 
problem described by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins.192 While 
prisons are paid for by state budgets, “prison populations are determined by 
the number of prisoners referred by local officials.”193 Because local police 
and prosecutors “do not contribute to central state correctional budgets, the 
marginal cost of an extra prisoner may be zero at the local level of 
government, where the decision to confine is made” even though it could be 
quite costly to the state.194 When federal grants and asset forfeiture dollars are 
added to the equation, local police often get more than just a corrections-free 
lunch—they are getting paid to eat.  
Among federal drug enforcement incentive programs, the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program has been particularly 
influential.195 The Byrne Grant program, named for a New York City police 
officer who was murdered while conducting a drug investigation, dates back to 
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1988.196 Congress established the program “with special emphasis on a 
nationwide and multilevel drug control strategy by developing programs and 
projects to assist multijurisdictional and multi-State organizations in the drug 
control problem and to support national drug control priorities.”197 Today, the 
grant program sends between $300 and $500 million to state and local law 
enforcement each year.198 Though Byrne Grants can be used “to support 
almost any criminal justice activity,”199 drug enforcement remains a primary 
focus, with “money supplement[ing] most police multijurisdictional drug task 
forces nationwide.”200 
A 2010 story from Shasta County, California provides a stark example of 
the sort of enforcement incentives these programs can create. There, federal 
grants led the county sheriff to reluctantly shift resources toward marijuana 
investigations.201 By “step[ping] up his pursuit of marijuana growers,” the 
sherriff’s department became “eligible for roughly half a million dollars a year 
in federal anti-drug funding.”202 At the same time the sheriff was putting more 
money toward marijuana investigations, however, he was forced to lay off 
more than 10% of his staff and cut nighttime police patrols in half.203 
“Marijuana may not be the county’s most pressing crime problem, the sheriff 
says, but ‘it’s where the money is.’”204 
Not surprisingly, some drug policy reform organizations argue that federal 
drug enforcement grant funding should be eliminated altogether.205 Other 
groups, like the Brennan Center, propose reimagining federal law enforcement 
grants.206 The Brennan Center argues that a central flaw of the Byrne Grant 
program is that its performance measures have asked grant recipients to report 
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things like “the number of arrests” and “the amount of cocaine seized,” 
leading local police to focus on those measures as targets.207 This practice is 
not limited to Byrne Grant performance measures. A 2009 DOJ-funded report 
on evaluating Multijurisdictional Task Forces listed “increases in drug 
seizures, arrests, etc.” as the first goal of the programs.208 The Brennan Center 
proposes moving to what it calls “Success-Oriented Funding” by using 
measures aimed at incentivizing more efficient law enforcement tactics.209 
Instead of measuring the number of arrests resulting from a grant, for example, 
recipients might be asked to report on the increase in percent of arrests for 
violent crime and the decrease in percent of arrests for misdemeanors.210 This 
would give recipients an incentive to focus more on solving violent crime 
investigations and less on arresting low level offenders (or on arrest numbers 
generally). Notably, in November 2014, the DOJ took a small but important 
step in this direction by “remov[ing] ‘number of arrests’ from its list of 
‘accountability measures.’”211 
Federal asset forfeiture policies have also played a key role in 
incentivizing state and local drug arrests.212 This is so even though every state 
also has its own drug-related civil asset forfeiture law.213 To understand why 
federal asset forfeiture law has been so influential, it is important to keep in 
mind two frequently criticized aspects of asset forfeiture: the low burden of 
proof for seizing assets and policies that let the police keep the proceeds from 
what they seize. The combination of these factors can turn drug enforcement 
into a revenue generating opportunity, encouraging state and local actors to 
make more drug arrests than they might otherwise. As discussed below, state-
level attempts to address these criticisms have been undercut by federal law, 
which gives the police a method for side-stepping stricter state asset forfeiture 
laws. 
Congress established the basic structure for modern federal drug-related 
asset forfeiture in 1970.214 But it was not until the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984 that the practice became a real force in drug 
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enforcement.215 Among other features, the 1984 law let federal law 
enforcement agencies keep the assets they seized.216 This resulted in an 
explosion in federal drug forfeitures.217 The law also created an “Equitable 
Sharing” program that gives some of the proceeds from seized assets to state 
and local law enforcement agencies that help the federal government.218 
Equitable sharing forfeitures come in two forms: “joint investigative” and 
“adoptive.” Joint investigative forfeitures divide proceeds from joint federal-
state/local investigations among the participating agencies based on their 
“direct participation in the investigation or law enforcement effort resulting in 
the forfeiture.”219 This “provides a substantial financial incentive for state and 
local law enforcement to participate in multi-jurisdictional task forces under 
federal leadership and otherwise to share information and resources with 
federal law enforcement—all in order to maximize the state and local equitable 
share.”220  
Even if no federal agency was involved in an investigation, however, 
adoptive forfeiture lets state and local agencies turn seized assets over to the 
federal government to be forfeited.221 In an adoptive forfeiture, the federal 
government gets 20% of the take, with the rest going to the state or local 
agency.222 Why would state or local police choose to give 20% of seized 
assets to the federal government? If a state’s asset forfeiture law has a higher 
burden of proof than the federal government’s preponderance of the evidence 
standard223 or limits the amount of money law enforcement groups can 
keep,224 an adoptive forfeiture lets state and local agencies circumvent those 
restrictions.225 
Recent investigative reports by The New Yorker and The Washington Post 
have vividly described how asset forfeiture laws can lead to troubling police 
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practices and distorted incentives. In Philadelphia, for example, police have 
“routinely seized” people’s homes “for unproved minor drug crimes, often 
involving children or grandchildren who don’t own the home.”226 This sort of 
overreach is almost inevitable when one considers that, nationwide, “210 
[drug] task forces have seized the equivalent of 20 percent or more of their 
annual budgets since 2008.”227  
Empirical evidence backs up the commonsense notion that asset forfeiture 
policies influence policing decisions. One analysis in 2000 estimated that laws 
that let the police keep seized assets are likely to increase drug arrest rates by 
about 18% and raise drug arrest rates as a portion of all arrests by 20%.228 As a 
2007 study succinctly concluded: “When police are really allowed to keep the 
assets they seize, they increase anti-drug policing.”229  
There has been some momentum toward dialing back asset forfeiture in 
Congress. Kentucky Senator Rand Paul has introduced the Fifth Amendment 
Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act, which would make a number of substantial 
reforms to asset forfeiture, including raising the federal government’s burden 
of proof for seizing assets and redirecting seized assets from the Attorney 
General’s coffers to the Treasury’s General Fund.230 Already, former Attorney 
General Eric Holder has implemented a more limited reform by issuing an 
order to prohibit most adoptive forfeitures231 and even some joint investigative 
forfeitures.232 
While it is clear federal programs incentivize state and local drug 
enforcement, any changes to these programs will only indirectly impact drug 
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arrest rates. The two federal reforms that have been implemented so far—
modifying the Byrne Grants program by removing number of arrests as a 
performance measure and restricting adoptive forfeiture—are especially likely 
to have only a modest effect on drug arrests. The Byrne Grant reform left the 
rest of the program’s funding structure system intact, and it is hard to say how 
much state and local agencies that are already accustomed to using the grants 
for initiatives focused on drug arrests will notice this change. The DOJ’s new 
forfeiture policy may be more likely to have a noticeable impact—it blocks 
almost all adoptive forfeitures (which make up about 16% of equitable sharing 
seizures) as well as “joint investigation” forfeitures that did not have any 
federal involvement before the seizure.233 In the future, reforms in these areas 
should go further by, for example, reserving federal grant money for local 
programs that aim to address drug use in a nonpunitive manner (such as the 
Seattle Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program, discussed below in 
Part III.E.1). But even sweeping changes to federal grant and asset forfeiture 
programs can only influence drug enforcement and arrest numbers so much.234 
At the end of the day, local decisions and policies are the biggest drivers of 
drug enforcement intensity. As a result, while reducing federal incentives will 
help to address the problem, reforms to federal law alone will not solve it.  
C. Incarceration 
Federal law and policy has more influence over drug incarcerations than 
drug arrests. While the vast majority of drug arrests are made at the local level, 
federal drug prisoners comprise a healthy percent of the overall drug prison 
population. As of August 2016, there were 83,982 federal drug prisoners.235 
With 210,200 state drug prisoners in 2012,236 that makes federal drug 
prisoners more than one-quarter of the total number of people in prison for 
drugs nationwide. 
It is not just the number of people in federal prison for drugs that is 
striking, but also the fact that many federal drug prisoners were only low- or 
mid-level drug operators (such as couriers, street dealers, or lookouts).237 
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Federal sentencing laws that can leave small-time drug offenders in federal 
prison for mandatory terms of five or ten years (or longer) have been one of 
the defining features of the drug war. Under mandatory minimum drug penalty 
statutes, and the closely linked provisions of the sentencing guidelines, federal 
drug sentences are determined mostly by the amount and type of drugs 
involved in an offense, not the offender’s role.238 As a result, “a defendant 
who does no more than help to unload a truck with a ton of cocaine starts at 
the same sentence level as those who arranged the shipment or who negotiated 
the sale or purchase of the drugs.”239 This approach has been criticized as a 
“kill shot to proportionality”240 in sentencing that “often punishes more 
harshly the narcotics crime that indirectly victimizes people (through increased 
violence, for example) than it does those direct victimizations.”241 Federal 
judges themselves sometimes say the sentences required by these provisions 
are far too long, even as they are imposing the punishment.242 Similarly, one 
of the DEA agents who helped to bring down the heads of the Arellano Félix 
Organization recently said of one lengthy federal sentence for a peripherally 
involved participant: “To me it’s like prosecuting the guy at Enron who 
delivers the mail . . . .”243  
With this in mind, changes to federal drug sentencing laws could have a 
real and direct impact on drug incarceration in the United States—both in 
terms of the number of drug prisoners and the proportionality of drug 
sentences. To get a sense of the options for withdrawal from the drug war on 
the incarceration front, a basic understanding of the current system of federal 
drug sentencing is essential.  
Federal drug sentencing involves two interrelated schemes: mandatory 
minimum penalties and the Sentencing Guidelines. Though Congress first 
began to revive mandatory minimum drug penalties in 1984, it was not until 
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the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that Congress “set up a new regime of non-
parolable, mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking offenses that 
tied the minimum penalty to the amount of drugs involved in the offense.”244 
This basic framework remains in place today.  
Federal mandatory minimum drug sentences are triggered when a drug 
trafficking crime (possession with intent to distribute, manufacture, 
conspiracy, etc.) involves a certain amount of drugs. For example, an offense 
involving 100 marijuana plants or 100 grams of heroin is subject to a five-year 
mandatory minimum; 1,000 marijuana plants or one kilogram of heroin means 
a mandatory ten years.245 If the defendant has a prior drug felony conviction, 
federal prosecutors can dramatically increase any applicable mandatory 
minimum sentence by filing for a recidivist enhancement.246 When a recidivist 
enhancement is filed, a single prior drug felony conviction—meaning any 
prior drug conviction that was punishable by more than one year of 
imprisonment247—doubles an applicable mandatory minimum sentence.248 
Two prior drug felony convictions can increase a ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentence to a mandatory life sentence.249  
Not all federal drug crimes carry a mandatory minimum sentence. There is 
no mandatory minimum for a trafficking offense if the drug amount falls 
below the statutory threshold—less than 100 marijuana plants or less than 100 
grams of heroin, for example.250 But most federal drug convictions expose the 
defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence.251  
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A defendant convicted of a crime carrying a mandatory minimum sentence 
still has two options to escape the minimum penalty: providing “substantial 
assistance” to the government,252 or qualifying for the so-called “safety 
valve.”253 To get the benefit of the safety valve, a defendant must meet five 
requirements, including having a very low criminal history (less than one 
criminal history point, as determined under the federal sentencing guidelines) 
and truthfully telling the government all the information she knows related to 
the offense.254 A little more than half of federal drug defendants facing a 
mandatory minimum sentence in 2010 were able to qualify for one or both of 
these exceptions.255 
Notwithstanding the “mandatory” label, for a mandatory minimum 
sentence to apply, the government must allege the mandatory penalty-
triggering drug quantity in the indictment and prove that fact to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.256 So, for example, if the government finds 150 
marijuana plants on Ed’s property and charges Ed with marijuana 
manufacture, the prosecutor must also allege the number of plants in the 
indictment in order to trigger the mandatory minimum penalty for 100 
marijuana plants or more. If the prosecutor does not allege the number of 
plants in the indictment against Ed and he is convicted, the mandatory 
minimum penalty will not apply in his case.  
Unlike mandatory minimum penalties, the Sentencing Guidelines apply to 
all federal felonies and serious misdemeanors.257 Created in 1984, the 
Guidelines were intended to promote uniformity in federal criminal 
sentencing.258 The United States Sentencing Commission oversees the 
Guidelines and has the authority to adjust their provisions administratively 
over time.259 
At the heart of the Guidelines sentencing system is a grid that specifies a 
sentencing range based on the severity of the offense of conviction (which can 
be adjusted up or down based on the application of other guidelines factors) 
and the criminal history of the defendant.260 With forty-three offense levels 
and six criminal history categories, there are 258 possible sentencing 
ranges.261 Each sentencing range is expressed in months.262 For example, an 
offense level of nineteen and criminal history category of III results in a range 
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of thirty-seven to forty-six months. A drug defendant’s base offense level 
under the Guidelines is pegged to the type and quantity of drugs involved in 
the offense.263 Perhaps not surprisingly, the drug type and quantity offense 
levels under the Guidelines were designed to try and match up with relevant 
mandatory minimum penalties where possible.264 Though the Guidelines are 
only advisory, judges impose a sentence within the applicable range in most 
cases.265  
As mentioned above, the Department of Justice and the Sentencing 
Commission have already taken some steps toward lowering federal drug 
sentences and dialing back the use of federal mandatory minimums.266 
Pursuant to an August 2013 DOJ memorandum, federal prosecutors have been 
advised not to include drug type and quantity when drafting indictments for 
drug defendants who meet a number of criteria (for example, those without 
significant ties to large drug trafficking organizations and who do not have 
more than three criminal history points).267 Because mandatory minimum 
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penalties are only triggered when drug type and quantity is charged in the 
indictment,268 the charging policy effectively eliminates mandatory minimum 
penalties in the cases where it applies. The policy also instructs prosecutors 
not to file recidivist mandatory minimum enhancements in certain cases.269 An 
analysis by the Federal Public Defender in 2013 estimated that 500 defendants 
annually will receive lower sentences as a result of the guidance.270 More 
recent data suggests the policy may be impacting more cases than this: in 
2012, 38.5% of all federal drug cases carried no mandatory minimum; in 2015, 
that number was 53.1%.271 
Even more significant, the Sentencing Commission amended the drug 
quantity guidelines in 2014 to reduce the base offense level for most drug 
types and quantities by two offense levels.272 The change means that a drug 
offense previously categorized as a base offense level of fourteen is now a 
base level of twelve.273 In practical terms, this is expected to reduce the 
average federal drug sentence by eleven months (17.7%), resulting in a 
reduction in the federal prison population of about 6,500 over five years.274 
The Commission also made its amendment retroactive, meaning that federal 
drug inmates who would have received a lower sentence under the new range 
can seek a retroactive reduction of their sentence.275 The Commission 
estimated that the retroactive application of the amendment will impact nearly 
half of all federal drug inmates (46,376), lowering their sentences by an 
average of twenty-five months (18.8%).276 Already, this one relatively small 
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change has yielded notable results. On the first day that inmates with reduced 
sentences were eligible to be released in November 2015, roughly 6,000 were 
freed.277 As discussed above, in addition to these new policies, legislative 
proposals envision even more far-reaching changes to federal drug 
sentencing.278  
Significantly, at the federal level, the post-1998 rise in the number of drug 
inmates has been due mostly to sentence length. The number of people being 
sent to federal prison for drug crimes remained relatively steady over this 
period, hovering in the low 20,000s.279 Yet, the number of federal drug 
prisoners went from 60,000 to nearly 100,000.280 Because drug sentence 
length has been “a key driver of growth in the federal prison population,”281 
the drug sentence reforms already adopted by the Sentencing Commission and 
the Department of Justice, along with the mandatory minimum reductions 
contemplated by proposed mandatory minimum sentencing reform legislation 
could have a very real impact on the number of federal drug prisoners even if 
admissions continue at a steady pace. 
Of course, even though federal law and policy has a much greater impact 
on drug incarceration than it does on drug arrest rates, states are still 
responsible for the lion’s share of drug imprisonment. And when it comes to 
state incarceration, the federal government has much less influence than it 
does over state and local arrest decisions. While federal grants and asset 
forfeiture policies give state and local police an incentive to focus on drug 
arrests, the federal government does not do much to incentivize particular state 
drug sentencing policies.282 To be sure, federal sentencing laws can sometimes 
indirectly impact state sentencing practices. A state prosecutor may be able to 
increase “the ‘market rate’ for bargained drug pleas in state court” by 
threatening to refer the case “to federal authorities for prosecution under 
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harsher federal law.”283 It is also possible that federal drug sentencing laws 
have an anchoring effect on state sentences.284 For the most part, however, 
state drug sentences are beyond federal control or influence. This makes it 
tricky for the federal government to do much to encourage states to reduce 
drug imprisonment through sentencing reforms.  
On the other hand, this also means there are not presently federal policies 
that incentivize states to maintain harsh drug sentencing laws. In the absence 
of the sorts of federal incentives that have contributed to high drug arrest rates, 
many states are well ahead of the federal government when it comes to drug 
sentencing reform.285 To be sure, in many instances, state reforms have 
amounted only to “minor tweaks” but other changes have been much more 
substantial.286 Recent state-level drug sentencing reforms include cutting 
penalties for drug possession, “shortening mandatory minimums or curbing 
their applicability, removing automatic sentence enhancements, and 
establishing or extending the jurisdiction of drug courts.”287 
In addition, efforts to lower drug arrest rates should also pay dividends 
when it comes to state drug incarcerations. Indeed, to reduce state drug 
incarceration rates, enforcement decisions may be a better area of focus than 
state sentencing laws. This is because, as John Pfaff has highlighted, state 
“drug inmates…serve fairly short terms in prison.”288 As a result, and in 
contrast to federal drug imprisonment where sentence length is king, Pfaff 
argues that state drug “sentenc[ing] reduction[s] will have only nominal, direct 
effects on incarceration in general—and likely on the incarceration of drug 
offenders alone.”289 According to Pfaff’s analysis, local prosecutors are “most 
responsible for determining the scale of incarceration.”290 As with arrests, 
federal grants as currently constituted may help to nudge prosecutors to pursue 
more cases, since one of the two Byrne Grant measures of prosecutor 
performance is “[n]umber of cases prosecuted.”291  
In sum, reducing state and federal drug incarcerations will be challenging. 
As is the case with drug arrests, even if Congress or every state legislature 
were to agree on a goal—for example, cutting the number of U.S. drug 
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prisoners in half—there would be no easy way to achieve it. The federal 
government can, however, do more to directly reduce drug incarcerations than 
it can to directly reduce drug arrests. Federal drug prisoners are more than one-
quarter of the total drug prison population and sentence length is the primary 
cause of the growth in the number of people in federal prison for drugs.292 As 
a result, there are clear steps that can reduce the number of federal drug 
prisoners. Indeed, the United States Sentencing Commission and the 
Department of Justice have already enacted relatively minor reforms that 
nevertheless promise noticeable reductions in the federal drug incarceration 
rate. Legislative action or additional amendments from the Sentencing 
Commission could do even more. The story is a bit different at the state level, 
where more than two-thirds of our nation’s drug prisoners are housed.293 With 
discretionary decisions by police and prosecutors largely responsible for 
driving state drug incarceration, any effort to reduce the state drug prison 
population may have to be focused mostly on local police and prosecutors, 
where effecting change in a coordinated way will be difficult.294 
D. Racial Disparities 
Despite the momentum toward an end to the drug war, there are still 
plenty of supporters of the status quo (or close to it) for drug arrest and 
incarceration levels. In contrast, the number of people who publicly disagree 
with the goal of eliminating racial disparities in drug enforcement is 
vanishingly small. This might suggest there is greater opportunity for 
achieving reform in this area than in others. After all, if almost everyone 
agrees on the issue, it should be easy to pass the necessary reforms.  
Unfortunately, attacking racial disparities in drug enforcement may be the 
most difficult task of all in the effort to achieve a drug truce. This is because, 
for the most part, today’s drug laws are entirely neutral when it comes to race.  
There are a few notable exceptions, in the form of facially race-neutral 
laws that are bound to have a disproportionate impact on people of color. The 
prime example of this is the different sentencing levels for federal crack and 
powder cocaine offenses. Before 2010, it took 100 times the amount of powder 
cocaine as crack cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum sentence.295 
In 2010, Congress reduced—but did not eliminate—this difference, lowering 
the ratio to 18-to-1.296 Because people of color are more likely to use crack 
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cocaine than they are powder cocaine,297 the sentencing ratio has an inherent 
racial bias. Likewise, sentencing laws that provide increased punishment for 
drug violations near schools necessarily have a disproportionate impact on 
people of color, who are more likely than whites to live in dense urban areas 
and within 1,000 feet of a school.298  
Apart from these examples, however, state and federal drug laws are 
mostly race neutral, at least in theory. After all, blacks and whites use and sell 
drugs at about the same rates,299 so it might seem that criminalizing the 
possession and sale of drugs should result in similar arrest and incarceration 
rates for both groups.300 Of course, as we know, that is not the case. The 
problem is not that we have discriminatory drug laws but that we have race-
neutral drug laws that are not being equally enforced. 
The distinction between discriminatory laws and discriminatory 
enforcement explains why it is so difficult to combat racism in the drug war. A 
discriminatory law can be repealed with a single piece of legislation. Not so in 
the case of discriminatory enforcement. Racial disparities in drug enforcement 
result from a number of interrelated causes, “including demographics, the 
extent of community complaints, police allocation of resources, racial 
profiling, and the relative ease of making drug arrests.”301 Most of these 
factors are highly localized. This means that a single state or local policy is 
rarely to blame for unequal drug enforcement. Instead, things like differences 
in local enforcement policies and practices from one jurisdiction to the next, or 
an individual officer’s (conscious or unconscious) bias are what drive 
disparities. Disparity results from New York City aggressively policing drug 
possession through stop-and-frisk,302 while police officers in the neighboring 
suburbs regularly let kids found with drugs off with a warning. Or from biases 
in individual decisions about whether or not to ask for consent to search during 
a routine traffic stop.303 
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Because police departments control their own budgets and enforcement 
tactics, leveling the amount of time and energy different localities put toward 
drug enforcement is not an option. There is simply no easy way to force 
Chicago and Evanston to dedicate equal resources to drug investigations. Even 
if there were, the conspicuousness of drug use and sales in cities relative to 
suburbs means catching offenders in densely populated areas will always be 
easier regardless of resource allocation decisions.304 Similarly, people are 
more likely to complain to local police and politicians about obvious public 
drug use and sales, which leads to greater enforcement. When drug activity is 
well hidden—as it more often is in wealthier neighborhoods—it will not draw 
reports to the police.305 For these reasons, even equal enforcement within a 
city is incredibly difficult to achieve. Affluent users and sellers are simply 
better able to hide their drug exchanges from the police.  
This is not to say that nothing can be done to try and make enforcement 
more equal, of course. Tightening asset forfeiture laws and rethinking federal 
enforcement grant programs could also help to make some progress on this 
front.306 These programs contribute to different levels of drug enforcement 
between localities. They also incentivize racially driven pretext stops, which 
officers are more likely to engage in when there is pressure to meet drug arrest 
quotas or to use drug enforcement as a tool for seizing assets.307 Ultimately, 
however, discretionary choices about resource allocation will mean different 
levels of drug enforcement in different cities, at least so long as we have local 
police departments rather than a state or national police force.  
Reducing drug arrests and incarceration might indirectly ameliorate 
enforcement disparities. But that is not guaranteed. After all, it is possible for 
racial disparities to increase even as overall enforcement declines.308 If 
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wealthy suburbs dramatically reduced drug enforcement while enforcement in 
the cities dipped only slightly, people of color might be less likely to face 
arrest in absolute terms, but disparities would almost surely rise. Similarly, 
giving federal judges broad sentencing discretion over drug crimes—a goal of 
many opponents of mandatory minimum sentencing laws—might result in 
lower sentences overall while also disproportionately decreasing sentences for 
whites.309  
Even decriminalization or legalization does not assure even-handed 
enforcement. After Massachusetts decriminalized marijuana in 2008, the racial 
disparity in marijuana arrests grew larger.310 The year before the law took 
effect, blacks were 3.42 times more likely than whites to be arrested for 
marijuana.311 The year after, that number had shot up to 5.34 times more 
likely.312 In Colorado, a 2015 report found that “[r]acial disparities in 
Colorado marijuana arrests persist and have not substantially changed after” 
legalization in the state.313 Indeed, increasing drug enforcement in places 
where drug use and sale by whites is common might be as effective (if not 
more) at reducing disparities than lowering arrests overall. Is there any doubt 
that if New York City-style “stop-and-frisk”314 programs were put in place on 
college campuses, drug arrest rates for white college students would come to 
mirror the high drug arrest rates in communities of color?315 
The strategies most likely to reduce racial disparities in drug enforcement 
may be those limiting the opportunity for police to engage in suspicionless 
drug searches. Disproportionate enforcement is far less common for other 
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offenses where investigations are driven by a victim’s report. On the other 
hand, it “can flourish in proactive investigations in which the police scan large 
numbers of people in search of culprits in crimes that have not been 
reported.”316 
There are policies that could markedly reduce the discretion police have in 
selecting people to target for drug searches. In its report on racial disparities in 
marijuana enforcement, for example, the ACLU proposed that police 
departments (or state legislatures) adopt rules requiring the police to inform 
people of their right to refuse a request to search and preventing the police 
from asking for consent to search without reasonable suspicion.317 Similarly, 
state legislatures could pass laws limiting the use of drug-sniffing dogs to 
circumstances where the police already have reasonable suspicion. These sorts 
of measures would seek to reduce bias in drug policing by taking away tools 
that facilitate racial profiling. Requiring police to have a good reason before 
asking for consent to search would reduce the chance for race to influence an 
officer’s decision to request consent or to make a pretextual stop in the first 
place. It would also curtail the use of department-wide drug policing tactics 
like aggressive stop-and-frisk programs. 
The trouble is that—thanks to the drug war—these tactics are now deeply 
ingrained elements of modern policing.318 As long as uncovering drug 
possession is considered to be an important mission for the police, it will be 
very hard to combat invasive and highly discretionary policing.319 As a result, 
police departments are exceedingly unlikely to agree to proposals that limit 
their discretion to gain consent to search for drugs.320 Although police 
opposition will make it difficult to enact these types of reforms, they may be 
necessary if we want to truly address the problem of racial disparities in drug 
enforcement.  
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E. Principles of a Drug Truce 
As the discussion so far reveals, ending the drug war will be a complex 
and lengthy process. With so many moving parts, any single reform can have 
only a limited impact on drug enforcement nationwide. Even a change to 
federal drug laws that went much further than the legislative proposals that are 
being seriously considered today—repealing mandatory minimum drug 
sentencing laws entirely or removing the federal prohibition on marijuana, for 
example—would amount to a withdrawal from just one of the drug war’s 
many battlefields.  
Achieving a drug truce will require a sustained and coordinated effort, 
with federal, state, and local officials from the legislative and executive 
branches working closely together on the effort. This will also mean thinking 
beyond the logistics of how to reduce drug arrests and incarcerations or 
combat racial disparities. In addition to asking how to end the drug war, we 
need to consider what will replace it. A strong vision of what a drug truce 
means can help to guide federal, state, and local decision makers. It is also 
essential to giving meaning and shape to abstract goals like reducing drug 
arrests. 
In some ways, this presents an even trickier challenge than making 
progress on the drug war’s measurable attributes. On the one hand, there is 
already fairly broad agreement on the need to end the drug war.321 But a 
consensus against the drug war is not the same thing as agreement about what 
should replace it. Opposition to today’s policies is not a viable strategy for 
drug policy over the long term. And this is where things become complicated. 
People who share common ground in opposing the drug war often have 
dramatically different visions about what should come next. Some picture a 
total break from the policies that we have today, starting with marijuana 
legalization. Others favor much more modest changes. 
Part of the difficulty is that the post-drug war era is unlikely to revolve 
around a single goal. War, by its nature, unites people with a shared purpose. 
Although there can be disagreement about strategy in a war, every tactic will 
be geared toward defeating the enemy (in this case, illegal drugs and drug 
use).322 When drug policy is no longer a war, there is room to consider other 
goals beyond use reduction. But ending the drug war does not necessarily tell 
us how to choose among competing goals. 
Consider one frequently cited alternative to the drug war: moving toward a 
public health approach to drugs. For some, treating drug abuse as a public 
health issue might mean increasing spending on drug treatment while also 
increasing drug arrests—the public health component would consist of sending 
                                                                                                                     
 321 See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
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heroes and enemies, battles and battlefields, and war-sized allocation of resources to 
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more of the arrestees to criminal drug treatment courts.323 For others, treating 
drug abuse as a public health issue starts with reducing drug arrests and 
perhaps even removing drug use from the criminal justice system entirely. 
Likewise, the idea of harm reduction as an alternative to the drug war does not 
necessarily point only in one direction when it comes to law and policy.324 
After all, most drug warriors also believe that their approach best reduces 
harm.325 
This Part proposes three principles that I argue can help to crystalize the 
open-ended concept of a public health-oriented approach to drug policy.  
1. The Criminal Justice System Should be a Last Resort for Addressing 
Drug Use 
In the war on drugs, drug use has been addressed mostly as a criminal 
justice problem. This has been true for casual users, addicts, and everyone in 
between.326 Consistent with this outlook, reforms to date have largely focused 
on measures to reduce punishments for drug users—making drug possession a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony, for example.327 These efforts are 
worthwhile, but cutting punishments for drug users does not address the core 
of the problem. 
The idea that illegal drug use is blameworthy conduct, deserving of 
punishment, is deeply ingrained in the drug war.328 But this attitude is not a 
necessary part of drug prohibition. If drug use is a health concern—like 
cigarette use or overeating—we should only use the criminal law to address it 
when there is a very compelling reason. Arresting drug users for possessing 
drugs simply in order to punish them is incompatible with the idea that drug 
use is a public health problem. If drug abuse is really a public health issue, the 
criminal justice system should be a last resort for addressing illegal drug use. 
Embracing this principle does not inescapably lead to any one policy, but it 
does mean we should move away from punishing drug use as if it were any 
other crime. There are a number of different policies that would be consistent 
with taking a nonpunitive approach to addressing drug use. A brief 
                                                                                                                     
 323 Kevin A. Sabet, A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to 
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2016] DRUG TRUCE 1371 
examination of two examples—Portugal’s civil drug court system and 
Seattle’s Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program—is instructive. 
Portugal’s drug decriminalization law presents perhaps the most far-
reaching model for treating drug use as a health concern. In 2001, Portugal 
removed criminal penalties for the purchase, possession, and cultivation of 
personal-use quantities of all drugs.329 The term “civil drug court” might be a 
better way to describe their policy than decriminalization, however.330 Instead 
of imposing a small fine on users—as most decriminalization laws in the 
United States do331—people found in possession of personal-use amounts of 
drugs in Portugal are given a civil summons to appear before a “dissuasion 
panel.”332 The panels are designed to be nonadversarial, and they are made up 
mostly of medical and social service professionals.333 If the panel members 
conclude that the person appearing before them does not have a drug abuse 
problem, they provide educational information and let the person go without 
any sanction.334 In other cases, the panel has a range of options available to it, 
from ordering check-ins to imposing a ban on visiting certain places to 
requiring the person to enter a treatment program.335 Because drug possession 
is no longer a crime, however, a criminal penalty is never an option, even for 
those who fail at treatment.336 
When Portugal first adopted its decriminalization law, the United States 
and the United Nations were vocal critics, claiming it would lead to drug 
tourism.337 Fifteen years later, none of these fears have come to pass and most 
observers have seen the law as a success.338 Of course, the point here is not to 
assess the merits of Portugal’s civil drug court policy relative to all other 
alternatives. Portugal provides a useful example, however, of a policy option 
                                                                                                                     
 329 See, e.g., Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider 
Moving from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 326–
29 (providing an overview of Portugal’s decriminalization law).  
 330 Id. at 300. 
 331 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
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that would be considered completely off-limits in the drug war but that should 
be given serious consideration in the era of a drug truce.  
Seattle’s Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program is 
another example of a program that puts into practice the principle that the 
criminal justice system should be a last resort for addressing drug use.339 
LEAD is a pilot program in which police officers divert certain low-level drug 
and prostitution offenders into treatment and services instead of arresting 
them.340 Although drug and prostitution offenses remain a crime in 
Washington State, the program harnesses enforcement discretion to provide 
suspects in qualifying cases support through public health programs instead of 
sending them directly into the criminal justice system.341 In contrast to 
criminal drug courts, where treatment occurs as a way to resolve a criminal 
prosecution, the LEAD program funnels people immediately into treatment 
and support.342 The program is still in its infancy. But early data suggests it 
has dramatically outperformed the “system-as-usual” when it comes to 
recidivism343 and achieved significant cost-savings.344 If the program 
continues to produce good outcomes without experiencing problems with 
respect to other factors like equal application of the law,345 it could become a 
model for minimizing the role of criminal punishment in drug enforcement, 
without the need for legislative reform.346 
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Importantly, both LEAD and Portugal’s civil drug court system are much 
truer to a public health model than our own criminal drug court model. 
Criminal drug courts are often cited as an alternative to incarceration and a 
public health reform. But they operate firmly within the criminal justice 
system and have the potential to increase drug arrests347 and even drug 
sentences.348 Most criminal drug courts follow a “punitive, enforcement-
oriented approach[]” in which “defendants are subject to mandatory economic 
sanctions and frequent drug testing” and where those “who fail to meet 
treatment expectations face incarceration.”349 Indeed, the rise in drug arrests in 
the 1990s happened side-by-side with the spread of criminal drug courts.350 
This is not to say that all criminal drug court programs are at odds with 
treating drug use as a public health problem. There are a number of different 
models for organizing criminal drug courts, and it is possible that some can fit 
within the vision of a public health approach to drug use. But, at least at some 
level, there is an inherent tension in using criminal drug courts as a public 
health strategy because criminal prosecutions are designed to impose 
punishment. As a result, the notion that we can simply expand our current drug 
court model as a tactic for ending the war on drugs is misguided, despite its 
superficial appeal. Instead, a postwar drug policy should look more closely at 
options like LEAD and civil drug courts. And within the category of criminal 
drug courts, programs should be oriented away from punishment as much as 
possible by, for example, following a pre-plea model as opposed to requiring a 
guilty plea as the price of admission.351  
2. Drug Trafficking Offenses Should be Classified as Nonviolent, 
Economically Motivated Crimes 
Any system of drug prohibition necessarily means addressing drug 
trafficking (sale, manufacture, etc.) through criminal enforcement. It is 
possible to identify categories of trafficking offenders for diversion 
programs—addicts, for example. But short of legalization, an end to the war 
on drugs will leave laws that criminalize the sale and manufacture of drugs in 
place. When it comes to trafficking offenses, the focus should be on 
recalibrating our approach to sentencing and enforcement.  
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In the drug war, drug trafficking offenses came to be rated as among the 
most serious crimes. Our sentencing laws treat drug crimes as offenses “of the 
highest order,”352 with the potential “to cause grave harm to society.”353 As 
Shima Baradaran recently observed, this approach has been fueled in part by 
the mistaken belief that drugs and violence are intimately linked.354 In fact, 
“research shows that there is actually not as much violence as is perceived” in 
drug trafficking.355 To be sure, illicit markets always entail a certain degree of 
violence because disputes cannot be resolved through legal avenues.356 But 
much of the drug trade consists of nonviolent transactions between a willing 
buyer and seller. Public policy may warrant criminalizing this conduct. But it 
surely falls into the category of malum prohibitum, not malum in se, crime.357  
In a post drug-war era, then, we should recalibrate drug penalties and 
policies to recognize drug trafficking crimes for what they are: nonviolent, 
economically motivated crimes. To be clear, this principle would not extend to 
violent crimes committed in the course of the drug trade. But the majority of 
drug trafficking offenders, who are engaged only in drug sales, smuggling, or 
manufacture, should not be classified as serious criminals deserving of severe 
punishment. Instead, they should be regarded as low-level offenders deserving 
of relatively minor punishment, aimed at decreasing drug availability and not 
seeking retribution.  
In their recent article, Why Not Treat Drug Crimes as White-Collar 
Crimes, Mark Osler and Thea Johnson make the case for adopting this sort of 
approach for federal drug sentencing.358 As they argue, “White-collar crimes 
are driven by the same moral infirmity as drug crimes: a desire to make money 
without concern for the effect of one’s actions on others or the illegality of 
what they are doing.”359 Indeed, the retributive case for punishing nonviolent 
drug offenders is on shakier ground than even most white-collar crimes. 
Although “the drug dealer and the fraudster are [both] taking legal and moral 
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risks to get rich,”360 drug sales are essentially consensual transactions.361 To 
be sure, we might still pass moral (and legal) judgment on someone who 
would knowingly sell a dangerous product. But it is hard to rate selling a 
dangerous item to a willing but imprudent buyer as more culpable than 
defrauding an unwilling victim.  
Osler and Johnson build on the idea that drug crimes are economically 
driven and nonviolent to propose specific changes to federal drug 
sentencing.362 For example, they suggest using “the profit taken from the drug 
business by an individual defendant,” as opposed to the type and quantity of 
drugs involved in the offense, to “establish culpability.”363 Of course, this is 
just one option among many for putting a post-drug war understanding of the 
severity of drug trafficking offenses into practice. The critical point for present 
purposes is that achieving an end to the drug war will require more than just 
reducing drug penalties within the current drug sentencing framework. We 
must also rethink how we view drug trafficking crimes on the continuum of 
criminal severity and the goals we are trying to achieve by punishing this 
conduct.  
3. States and Localities Should be Encouraged to Innovate 
Last, ending the drug war will require reconceptualizing the relationship 
between federal and state drug laws. In the context of the drug war, laws that 
might undercut the goal of a drug-free society (even in appearance) have been 
considered a “form[] of surrender.”364 Consistent with this view, when a 
handful of states began pursuing policies that were at odds with drug war 
ideology in the 1990s—most notably, by enacting medical marijuana laws—
the federal government went to great lengths to try and stop them, albeit 
without success.365 After all, acquiescing to these sorts of reforms would mean 
“admitting defeat in the power struggle between good and evil that is the 
essence of [the drug war’s] account of drug use and abuse.”366 
While a war on drugs requires a uniformity of purpose in federal, state and 
local policies, a post-drug war prohibition that is focused on public health can 
allow—and should encourage—diversity and innovation. If we no longer have 
a national policy fixated on the pursuit of a drug-free society, there is no 
reason for the federal government to insist that all state and local drug laws be 
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directed toward use reduction. Instead, the federal government should give 
state and local lawmakers latitude in deciding how to balance competing goals 
when setting drug policy. This is because pursuing a public health approach to 
drug policy means focusing on outcomes and supporting the study and 
collection of data from a range of policy options. 
This principle is already beginning to take hold in the marijuana 
legalization setting. State laws legalizing marijuana for adult use are perhaps 
the best tangible evidence that the drug war is truly coming to an end. Once 
thought impossible, marijuana legalization is now the law in eight states.367 
For years, the federal government fought tooth and nail to block state medical 
marijuana laws, including during the better part of President Obama’s first 
term in office.368 After Colorado and Washington passed the first legalization 
laws in 2012, however, the President and Congress started to come around to 
the idea of permitting state marijuana reforms to move forward.369  
In 2013, the Department of Justice issued guidance to federal prosecutors, 
instructing them to exercise their discretion to avoid targeting people in 
compliance with state medical and adult-use marijuana laws.370 Then, in late 
2014, Congress passed a federal budget that included an appropriations rider, 
preventing the Department of Justice from spending money to prevent the 
implementation of state medical marijuana laws.371 Though far from a long-
term solution to the conflict between state marijuana reforms and federal 
prohibition,372 these measures signal a recognition that, as the drug war winds 
down, federal law may have to grant states room to try out new approaches. 
The principle of encouraging diversity and innovation in drug policy has 
relevance beyond marijuana. Consider, for example, the idea of heroin-assisted 
treatment (also sometimes called heroin maintenance). Heroin-assisted 
treatment programs have been implemented in a number of countries, 
including Switzerland and Canada.373 Although the specifics vary, these 
programs allow seriously dependent heroin addicts who have failed at 
conventional treatment options to receive heroin “under the strict supervision 
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of medical staff in a controlled, sterile environment.”374 The idea is to reduce 
health risks to program participants and allow them to lead a more stable life 
in spite of their addiction. The programs also seek to help users transition off 
of heroin, where possible.375  
Results from existing heroin maintenance programs suggest they can be an 
effective option for treating heroin addicts for whom other treatment options 
have failed.376 They are sometimes held out as a model example of putting the 
theory of harm reduction into practice. But federal drug laws make it 
impossible for a city or state to implement a heroin-assisted treatment program 
in the United States, even on a trial basis.377 This is because distributing 
heroin, whether on the streets or as part of a local-government run treatment 
program, is a federal crime. As a result, while the government’s response to 
the sharp rise in opiate use has largely focused on treatment and not law 
enforcement,378 heroin maintenance remains off-limits. Indeed, even a more 
restricted program like a supervised injection facility—in which intravenous 
drug users are able to “inject drugs they obtain elsewhere under the 
supervision of healthcare providers”379—are likely untenable under existing 
federal law. When the mayor of Ithaca, New York recently expressed interest 
in establishing a supervised injection facility to help combat overdoses, for 
example, federal law appears to have quickly made the idea a nonstarter.380 
Reasonable minds can, of course, disagree about the wisdom of heroin 
maintenance programs or supervised injection facilities. But the drug war 
ideology has meant these sorts of ideas are off-limits entirely, because even 
debating their merits is an admission of defeat. When San Francisco officials 
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expressed an interest in supervised injection facilities in 2007, federal drug 
officials called the idea “a form of giving up.”381 In a post-drug war era, the 
federal government should not block state and local reforms simply on the 
theory that they amount to giving up or surrendering in the drug war. Instead, 
cities and states should be given room (and, indeed, be encouraged) to try out 
new policies, even if they are inconsistent with the vision of a drug-free 
society. 
V. CONCLUSION 
President Obama’s first drug czar claimed to have ended the drug war in 
2009,382 and yet federal drug laws are more or less identical to what they were 
ten or twenty years ago. Many drug war detractors are understandably 
frustrated that the pace of change has not been quicker.383 But it would be a 
mistake to underestimate the significance of the rhetorical shift of the past few 
years. After all, Nixon’s declaration of a war on drugs predated Reagan’s 
implementation of the war’s signature laws and policies by more than a 
decade.384 And so, while the drug czar’s announcement of a drug truce was in 
many ways premature, the war really has already ended in an important sense. 
It is no longer the organizing political principle for U.S. drug policy. The 
question is what comes next.  
Political opposition to the drug war has not yet yielded concrete reform at 
the federal level. The drug war’s defining features—high arrest and 
incarceration rates, along with disturbing racial disparities—are also still with 
us. Making measurable progress in these areas will be incredibly difficult. The 
war on drugs is much more unwieldy than social security or the Affordable 
Care Act. It is a mash of federal, state, and local laws and policies developed 
over the course of four decades. The decentralized nature of drug enforcement 
means that ending the drug war will not be as simple as getting a package of 
legislation through Congress. 
Defining the principles that should guide a drug truce may be harder still. 
The drug war was the relentless pursuit of a drug-free America at any cost. 
Whatever replaces this vision will necessarily be much more nuanced. A 
public health approach to drug policy requires carefully weighing costs and 
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benefits and balancing competing goals, not marching in lockstep toward a 
single objective.  
As we move into a new era of drug policy, there will inevitably be sharp 
disagreements about what an end to the drug war should look like and how to 
get there. My hope is that this Article will help to inform this important, 
nascent, and long-overdue discussion.  
VI. POST-SCRIPT 
After this Article was accepted for publication and nearing publication, 
Donald J. Trump surprised most political watchers by winning the presidency. 
President Trump has not made his views known on many key drug policy 
questions. As a candidate, Trump spoke of “law and order.”385 And his 
nominee for Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, is known as a fierce supporter of 
mandatory minimum drug sentences and an opponent of marijuana 
legalization.
386
 All of this has raised the question of whether the emerging 
consensus against the drug war may be reversing itself. At the same time, 
other signs this past election cycle point toward the drug war’s continued 
decline. The 2016 election also saw marijuana reform initiatives pass in eight 
of the nine states where they were on the ballot.387 President Obama ended his 
term by granting a historic number of clemency applications for federal drug 
offenders, without any significant political blowback.388 Finally, there is 
speculation that Vice President Mike Pence may support federal mandatory 
minimum sentencing reform and work to help get it passed.389 Only time will 
tell whether the 2016 election marks a turn back toward the drug war. This 
Article is written in the hope that we will continue on the path toward a drug 
truce. 
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